Tag Archives: bombing raids

Dropping Dozens of Bunker-Buster Bombs in Beirut

A pillar of orange smoke rose over Dahiyeh, outside of Beirut, the site of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s death, on the night of September 27, creating a crater some twenty feet deep. As local residents flooded shelters in downtown Beirut from the southern suburb, the intense bombing illuminated the night sky an extreme show of force that Israeli Air Force knew no boundaries in the control it exercised to defend its borders across the Middle East. Dozens of precision-guided bombs that enetered four high rises were designed to penetrate heavily fortified bunkers or caves with a thirty five meter radius; the bombs exploded at time delay after entrance, destroying the four buildings with a force three times of bombs dropped by United States in the Iraq War. The headquarters Hezbollah used to coordinate military responses since October 8, 2023 was reduced to a fifty meter deep crater as large as an entire city block in Beirut’s southern suburb, erasing its presence.

The airstrike that killed Nusrallah together with seven highly ranking Hezbollah commanders and officials from the powerful group sought to paralyze the deep commitment to support for Hamas on Israel’s northern border, and the increased flare-ups along the occupied Golan Heights. The massive explosion of dozens of bunker-buster bombs–designed for fortified compounds, more than residential settlements–itself mapped the overlap between militants and civilian residences that Israel had long argued non-state actors had taken advantage, using communities as human shields, and has led to the blurring of so-called “safe zones” that have so tragically become sites for the massacring of innocent civilians with a regularity that is truly hard to stomach, that has provoked global indignation, which the airstrike against Nusrallah–followed by killing Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar after he was encountered in a civilian zone in Rafah, a city on the Gaza Strip’s border with Egypt. The massive scale of the vengeance strike in Beirut was a response to the tranquility of the AI scene, suggesting the deep evil character of the non-state actors and disabling their abilities of resistance.

The massive explosion of military munitions in the Beirut suburb didn’t erase a global threat posed by militants–but rather magnified it, escalating cross-border violence to a new threshold and level of destruction with a rapidity that is unprecedented. The complex politics of the Middle East since October 7, 2023 were cast as a conflict of good and evil, but the execution of the Shiite Muslim secretary-general long designated a “global terrorist” reconfigured a long-simmering local border conflict as a war far beyond its borders, or the safety of those borders. Indeed, the air raid was a transgression against the very authority of or respect for borders in targeting non-state actors within a narrative beyond states. The fear of a global threat–a threat to the Jewish people only able to be understood in global terms–that Nusrallah propounded justified the huge deployment of force, magnifying and realizing the rhetoric of destruction as an escalation that can only be understood in retributive terms of a lex talionis, outside either international law or the laws of war.

The strike at the heart of Beirut’s residential neighborhood was a qui pro quo responding to attacks on Israeli territory. The attacks were on territorial claims long denied by Hamas and Hezbollah–but the retributive strike of long planning was a proof of concept of the power of the Israeli Defense Forces had to strike–and indeed flatten-any village in Lebanon to protect its own frontier, civilian loss of life discounted. The assassination was a demonization of all civilian infrastructure violating international law, but presented as a retributive strike for a higher good–a “measure of justice” to achieve war aims, and a map of frontiers, escalating the violence of the war on civilians beyond earlier wars, even amidst current calls for de-escalation. Rather than map the war by frontiers, or by national borders, the attack on the stronghold of the non-state actor in Beirut flattened four buildngs to kill its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and elite, blurred boundaries of civilian casualties and military targets in violation of international law and legitimate tactics of war. The bunker where senior leadership convened for strategy seemed an actual bonanza. But in expanding the battle beyond Israel’s actual frontiers, yet of utmost urgency as a jackpot strike against the leadership who had perpetuated the assault on its northern frontier. The Israeli Defense Forces boasted, “Hassan Nasrallah will no longer be able to terrorize the world” spoke to the globe–as if justifying the huge show of force–three times the bombs of the “shock and awe” Iraq War on a Beirut suburb as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the United Nations.

People Displaced During Armed Confrontations on Southern Lebanon Border from October 8, 2023-August 22, 2024/ Mobility Snapshot by International Organization on Migration (IOM) Based on Daily Monitoring/UN

The strike was an explosion not only of six apartment complexes, but an illustration of the power of a retributive logic of cross-border attacks, a logic manifested the violent military exchange across borders that have led to the growth of evacuation zones, non-man’s lands, and dead zones. Whereas the unclear locations of the Israeli hostages in the tunnels of Gaza City were not known–and while the leader of Hamas, and mastermind of the October 7 invasion, Yahya Sinwar, has long surrounded himself with “at least twenty hostages” per the expert on the conflict who interrogated him for Shin Bet, Kobi Michael, who continues to elude Israel Defense Forces in the Gaza tunnel networks. The assassinations of Hezbollah leadership flouted borders to send a message.

The bombing escalated the exchanges of rockets fired from southern Lebanon’s territory from early April, as border tensions on Israel’s northern border heated up, all but invoking a higher narrative of collective memory to sanction destroying infrastructure for staging attacks in Southern Lebanon on northern Israel.  Israeli Defense Forces Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari “contacted the residents of the three buildings in the Dahieh” living in units “above and near Hezbollah’s strategic assets must evacuate immediately for their safety and security,” blaming Hezbollah for placing their lives at risk by burying “strategic capabilities . . . underground in Beirut,” demanding a bomb of requisite force in a residential neighborhood by a surgical strike as itself an abnormal violation of the law. (Hagari indeed advocated a surprise reprisal attack on Lebanon after the October 7 invasion, not Gaza.) In the year since the invasion, Israeli forces fired some 80% of rockets across the border. But the assassination of Nasrallah together which Hezbollah’s high command was followed by the displacement of a quarter of Lebanon’s population–some 1.2 million innocents, a mass exodus is rarely mapped–poorer Lebanese citizens; Palestinian refugees; migrant workers, and Syrians, and killing over 1400 residents of the region.

Displacement of Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian Civilians from Lebanon, October 8, 3023-August 20, 2024

But the redrawing of the lines of “normal” interaction of the strike–and in the war–was predicated on erasing the idea of clear parameters of safety or precaution, expanding the battle zone in ways that frontier and border disputes can no longer illustrate or explain, as we map the “evacuation zones” imposed by the Israeli Defense Forces based on the data they released against the border which has ceased having much practical (or even tactical) meaning any more. The dispensing of the border as a unit on the map seems to have been the terrible result of the logic of this war.

Guardian/Evacuation Zone, October 1

BBC, October 8, 2024/IDF Data, OpenStreetMap

These “warnings” may arrive only a half hour before the start of bombing, as if their delivery has become increasingly perfunctory, provided as a script to undertake the bombing of a broad sector of the border zone the first week of October, per a recent map of Amnesty International, rather than in a manner that would allow civilians to plan evacuations at all, researches like Ahmad Baydoun have found, trying to track not the arrival of bombs by IDF data, or their effect and impact on the ground, but the communication to residents living south and north of the Litany River.

Villages and Regions Impacted by Evacuation Orders, October 1,2024-October 7, 2024/Ahmad Baydoun, OSM

The frame of reference for the barge of such precision strikes are increasingly cast in terms of divine wrath and retribution–and the killing of Hassan Nasrallah charged with opening a “northern front” against Israel, linking that war to the army’s defense of Israel’s borders. American President Joe Biden explained the strike on Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah as a retributive act–“a measure of justice for his many victims” –echoing the apocalyptic terms Netanyahu cast the war, by a Biblical frame of reference as much as a geopolitical explanation. Indeed, while this is a war pursued on non-state actors–Hamas; Hezbollah; the Houthi in Yemen–the tribal terms in which they are cast by reference to Amalek, often tied to the “chief of the sons of Esau” in the Bible, as a nomadic tribe of ancient Israel or Canaan–who came before all other nations to make war on Israel, or to the descendants of Esau, whose tribe first encountered the ancient Jews as they came “out of Egypt,” and were the first and primal enemy inhabiting the idolatrous cities that demanded destruction–destroying the original inhabitants of Canaan to fulfill the covenant with Abraham, for a conquest in a Promised Land. If the October 7 attack reawakened Israel to the fact that the New Middle East could not avoid the Palestinians, it led to the evocation of the Amalekites, leading Netanyahu to invoke Amalek, as if prompting the involuntary memory of collective recitation,  “You must remember what Amalek has done to you, says our Holy Bible. And we do remember.”

The imperative remapped power dynamics within the Middle East in a way that was best evoked by a Black Cloud. The tribe of Amalek is not thought to have existed, but the current war is animated by a rhetoric foregrounding the divine punishment of Amalek “for what he did to the Israelites.” Th punishment has been long remembered, celebrated and recited as a collective truth in a scriptural narrative. It has become a terrifying topos justifying a war without borders, of visiting divine wrath. The pronouncement by Israeli Defense Forces “Hassan Nasrallah will no longer be able to terrorize the world” was not an understatement, but a justification of the totally overwhelming use of force. The increased equation of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi with this mythic tribe, allowing Netanyahu to lump these allies together, casts them as a war against Israel that must be waged as one of divine wrath, and a war that will be truly apocalyptic–that mirror Nasrallah’s own fiery rhetoric. Indeed, the repeated invocation of the Amalekites kept alive the memory of biblical destruction, leading up to the invasion of Gaza and the invasion of Lebanon, that offered something like an alternative orientation to a map, a model of describing the relation of the Jewish people to justice, and to escape the confines of international law–and indeed of nations. This is not a newly deployed future–Netanyahu compared the prospect of a nuclear Iran to Amalek before the US Congress in 2015, declaring that “the days when the Jewish people remained passive in the face of genocidal enemies are over”–even though the comparison to a ritualized memory of a biblical memory is absurd to modern geopolitics, and made Israel unlike any “normal” nation. Yet the “normalcy” of these operations depends on inherited narratives of scripture to motivate a military campaign without any clear endpoint of goal, that stands to consume the land.

The threat of failing to exterminate and destroy Amalek has redrawn the map of the Old Middle East in place of any rapprochement to Saudi Arabia in a New Middle East, which is now relegated to the past. This makes the invocation of the “Curse” that the Middle East faced out of keeping with the family of nations–or the participating of a council of “normal” nations, the United Nations–or hopes for peace among “a new Middle East, between Israel, Saudi Arabia and our other neighbors.” The a community of nations joined by a nation forged by shared memory of how it had come out of bondage, but been defined by a lineage and shared memory. The “Curse” lay outside of any nation’s history, and, via the invocation of a perhaps purely legendary people of the Amalekites was elided with the new shadowy non-state actors, identified as part of the “war against Amalek throughout the ages” that was waged by Jews. And Nasrallah’s refusal to cease waging war on Israel and fire on its northern regions until the end to all Israeli hostilities in the region of Gaza, a belief tied inseparably to his conviction that he was indeed shaped by having watched  “what happened in Palestine, in the West Bank, in the Gaza Strip, in the Golan, in Sinai” and Israeli hostilities in Gaza. At the same time as the war has been pursued, in hopes some living hostages survive in the two hundred tunnels below Rafah, the slogan of global alertness–“All Eyes on Rafah”–calls attention to the dangers of residents of the city were Gaza’s 2.3 million civilians were forced to migrate–a social media counter-offensive, launched in parallel to Israel’s military offensive in early May if generated by AI and shared on Instagram and TikTok, of orderly rows of tents.

These hostilities have made that border war with Lebanon not about a Blue Line, or about Lebanon’s border with Israel, but about the persistent conflict of Palestine with an Israeli state. The attacks on Gaza increase the license of cross-border attacks on Israel, Nasrallah felt, justifying the lethality of the strikes independent from their legality, expanding a “balance of terror” to an axis of resistance.

Nasrallah Preaching, circa 2014

The activation of the memory of the Amalekites provided a way to understand the need to visit destruction on the Amalekites as a way of living in the present. The ritualistic memory of the tribe who were hereditary enemies of the Israelites from the time of their arrival in Canaan elided the Palestinians–and Palestinian identity–with an ancient enemy of the ancient Israelites native to the Negev, dating from the era of Moses and Joshua, transporting audiences to pitched battles of an era of stateless wandering from a period before settlement in the Holy Land, who in Exodus had viciously attacked the Israelites at battles in the actual battlegrounds of the Sinai Peninsula, recalling the Mosaic altar inscribed with promise that “The Eternal will be at war with Amalek throughout the ages,” as if they were continuing a war of extermination internalized ritually, but was now transposed from a historical Canaan to a nationalistic notion of Israel’s frontiers: did the boundaries even have to exist or be drawn to continue the war that Amalek had himself advised other nations afraid to join him to join his initial push against their : “Come, and I shall advise you what to do. If they defeat me, you flee, and if not, come and help me against Israel.” Is not “war against Amalek [continued to be fought against the continuity of the deep rhytms of history] throughout ages?” The memories of these deep rhythms are preserved by telling, hearing, and repeating, but kept alive as a way of looking forward by looking back and–as Gabriel Josipovici observed of Jewish scripture–“by looking back only to help it move forward” in the “ritual recalling of what once happened” that is not historical or fixed in remote time, but an ongoing story, not motivated by looking back with nostalgia, but by demanding reform in the present.

The jagged line of the current de fact division of the states was never an international boundary, but the conscious choice of Deuteronomic terms of vengeance and retribution of the current mission to “blot out the memory of Amalek from under heaven” as one of eliminating attackers of the state of Israel–transform a war disputing boundaries to one of smiting those who staged an attack of viscious surprise on the Israeli people–erasing the long contested boundaries of northern Israel to an existential war at the heart of Judaism, devastating land, property, and border lines. The references are not only asserting a biblical right to territory, but a Jewish Holy war, mirroring the oratory of non-state actors as Hamas and Hezbollah, that stands in place of a language of nations.

Israel-Lebanon De Facto Boundary Demarcation Line

The boundary derived from triangulation of Palestine in 1948 that became the base map for the state of Israel–boundaries with Lebanon from the Mediterranean to cairns at Las-el-Nukurah, Khirbet Danian, Labuna, the edge of cultivated lands of the Waddi Kutayeh east to the Wadi Dalem as an armistice line, rather than an international boundary, to the villages of Ramia, Rita-al-Shaub, and valleys of Wadi Bediyeh, to villages of Tarun, El Malikiya and eastern village of Meis, Odessa, and Metallic or Metulla, the cairns of triangulation of the armistice line never intended as an international boundary than a line of withdrawal for Israel’s army, even in the Blue Line–a de facto line, provisional more than ever intended to conclusively resolve borders or boundary disputes. The mutation of a fixed line to security zones, and zones to be cleared of population, not only to meet the demands of Orthodox supporters of his own government, the language of biblical vengeance was supported by the invocation of the “horrific attacks of October 7,” attacks that were clearly intentionally designed to provoke the collective memories of panic of an actual holocaust–removed from any mere debate about “borders” and “boundaries” on a map. As Netanyahu used the narrative of “genocide” in terms of a revenge on the Amalek–“Go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass“–as an existential threat, the armistice boundary of Lebanon was undone, erased and replaced by a devastation of a border zone.

The pseudo-scriptural injection to “eradicate this evil from the world” has been cast as for the benefit of American evangelicals or indeed for Orthodox allies, sanctioning his attacks on Gaza by the fact that “the Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation,” so much as a statement of the collective memory of Jews Palestinians would recognize and shudder. The projection of divine law offered a transcendence of the legal boundaries of Israel, unable to undermine or be in conflict with Israel’s longstanding aspiration to be a “normal” nation-state. If the triangulation of Palestine that preceded the State of Israel organized the mapping of temporary land settlements in a framework of organizing the territory in terms of its colonial administration, visualizing the temporary nature of divisions of land as a state of “permanent temporariness,” rather than of temporality. Indeed, the claims of naturalizing or institutionalizing boundaries present at the founding of the state of Israel are quite dramatically being undone and revised in the current remapping border zones of Southern Lebanon. While they may seem to be in terms of “Friend” and “Enemy”–the polarity of politics famously espoused by political theorist Carl Schmitt in the Nazi Era–the zones of evacuation, exclusion, and displacement are not about sovereignty, in a Schmittian sense at all: as much as a political theology, the intensity of such retributive strikes are Deuteronomic at core, if designed tto preserve the safety of an Israel. It is a logic of securing its borders to “blot out the memory of Amalek from under heaven” per the Book of Deuteronomy, by visiting a retribution of such intensity and wrath that emulates the divine. The operations bring commands of remembrance–“Remember what the Amalekites did to you when you came out of Egypt . . .”–of scriptural origin to the modern day. Indeed, the figure this fictive tribe of Amalekites occupies in collective memory is an imprecation that today is akin to “Never forget . . .,” of deep resonance for the Jewish nation as a biblical collective memory from the very foundation of the Jewish people, no longer of a removed historical event but a living memory by virtue of its repetition as an ancient event bounded in space and time, that has become timeless.

If the injection is experienced as a bonding of God to his children as much as a leader to a nation, it has created a new logic of cross-border attack that demands to be appreciated outside the political. For as much as merely the recollection of a removed event of scriptures, the figure of Amalekites has become or been activated in contemporary Israeli political discourse and theology as a guide of living in the present; the call to “remember” becomes to learn how to remember becomes a way to “know” of a resonance that transcends political boundaries–even those confirmed in December, 1948, after the First Arab-Israeli War, at the Israeli Declaration of Independence that created the boundaries Israel shared with Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. If those boundaries were created by a series of famous armistices signed with Egypt on February 24, with Jordan March 3, and with Lebanon on March 23, 1948, the last of which set a basis for military withdrawal at the “Blue Line” that led Israeli forces to withdraw from thirteen villages in Lebanon’s territory, on July 20, 1949, the armistice line that was agreed to in Northern Israel is no longer a line of armistice,–but has been cast in a different collective memory, no longer on paper maps or set stations of triangulation–

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Israeli Delegation to 1949 Armistice Talks: Yehoshafat Harkabi, Aryeh Simon, Yigael Yadin, Yitzhk Rabin

Geodetic Triangulation of Palestine, 1946

–but by the logic ofan internalized narrative. The frontier nominally about a line of withdrawal enemy forces was, indeed, a basis to visit violence of a new level of complete destruction, and a new sort of enemy beyond the notion of a boundary dispute, and which challenged registers of mapping that reflected only on-the-ground damage: the level of damage inflicted over nine months and more of border fighting between the Israeli Defense Forces and armed Hezbollah forces in Lebanon goes beyond a border dispute, as the reference to the Amalekites tapped a collective memory of a litany of destruction that in fact knew no place, but was an almost timeless narrative not confined by space or time, a visiting of vengeance on a people who demanded divine punishment–“Now go and attack the Amalekites and completely destroy everything they have. Do not spare them. Kill men and women, infants and nursing babies,[1] oxen and sheep, camels and donkeys“–that was a divine judgement and not even a human one between nations or nation-states. This alone served to explain the non-state actors who attacked Israel–Hamas and Hezbollah–in ways that were foreign to a discourse of nations or a law of nations.

If the complex military situation on the ground was extremely contingent, and multinational in its composition of conflicting Syrian Iraqi, and Lebanese “Defensive” forces, the complex armistice line determined along the mountainous terrain of Southern Lebanon respected Israeli military control, if it was drawn along the line between Lebanon and Mandatory Palestine, with careful attention to Armistice Demarcation Lines that hinged on the control over mountainous terrain as much as permanent legal borders–at Arab insistence–but which would mutate into Israeli borders–refusing to recognize the boundaries as a settlement of the Palestine question in interim agreements that lead to the creation of demilitarized zones around many of Israel’s “borders” never leading to the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon,–a problem of renewed relevance today.

Into this absence of clear cartographic rendered boundaries, and a stasis of military control led to deep resentment, the invocation of the shared memory of almost involuntary rather than voluntary recollection entered, echoing the imperatives to preserver memory and keep memory alive that may have been consciously invoked by the brutality of the invasion of October 6 by Hamas, but was a away to process the violence of the invasion. The tag “Amalekites” emerged as a counter-memory meriting the retribution on a biblical scale, invoking the Deuteronomic law of a lex talionis, not about the actual ancient landscape of the Middle East of Canaan–in which no proof has ever been found for the Amalekites–but an anathema-like demonization of a living threat to the Jewish people, tied to the deep political rhythms of their suffering and the affirmation of their primary and precedent tie to God–irrespective of who first inhabited the land of Canaan east of the Jordan, whether the Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites or Amalekites. For in the ritual recitation of Jewish belonging, it was the Amalekites who had joined the nations ion Moab and the Ammonites to attack the Israelite tribes, capturing “the city of palms” – perhaps Jericho or its pasture lands–(Judges, 3:12-13), and joined the Midianites in destroying the crops of farmlands they raided as desert tribes, before their decisive destruction, when Saul responded to the divine request to obliterate their memory by driving the nomadic tribe back close to the border of Egypt, reducing the influence of the Amalekites in the border regions of Judah and the Negev, back into the western Negev. The timelessness of a struggle against evil was a far more powerful lens to see the current war as a dichotomy between Good and Evil, removed from circumstances of dispossession of land, and far preceding the foundation of Israel in 1949.

This was a construction of the Palestinians in the modern Middle East as removed from actual problems of discrimination, an apartheid Israeli, or a dispossession of homes, but as an enemy to the Jewish state. The tag of the Palestinians as a tribal people of the desert–the “Amalekites”–were terrifying fighting words to designate Palestinians in Israeli politics. In national discourse, the evocation of Amalekites, even if the tribe is now thought never to have existed in Canaan, save in the scriptures as a people whose destruction was worthy of memory. The offense preserved in Deuteronomy and the Book of Samuel has become shorthand for acts of violence preserved in the collective narrative of Israel’s eternal memory; these original inhabitants of Canaan who terrorized the Jews. The Amalekites had occupied a figural if imaginary prominence as a threat preserved in collective memory of the Jewish people through Deuteronomy 25:17, a touchstone of calling to witness, and a call to witness in post-Holocaust Israel, a process of bearing that was deployed to process October 7 the violence of the attacks as an invasion meriting immediate retribution, and process events that intentionally triggered reflexive memory of the violence of a pogrom occurring on Israeli soil. The visiting of a ritual terror on the Israeli people merited a lex talionis akin to Amalek was not modern in any way, but confirmed the tribal nature of the peoples who had lived in Canaan before the Jews’ arrival out of Egypt. Both recent Israeli settlers and right-wing politicians have deployed the imagined tribe as a figure foreign to the world of “normal” nations, to conure an existential nemesis to be destroyed with a violence that did not belong to the world of normal nations, of divine proportions; the violence may stand in contradiction with Israel’s founding goal to be seen as a “normal” nation not unlike other nations from its 1948 founding, a steep problem of there constitution as if an exception of the ability to pursue geonocide.

The terrifying salience of the Amalekites in contemporary political discourse among settlers and Likud members is particularly striking, and suggests more than an audience to which Netanyahu played. Benzi Lieberman, Chairman of the Council on Settlements, invoked with zealousness the destruction of Palestinians by the boogeyman of Amalekites to map a people worthy of destruction–“The Palestinians are Amalek! We will destroy them. We won’t kill them all. But we will destroy their ability to think as a nation. We will destroy Palestinian nationalism.” Similarly, Likud activists used the equivalence to justify genocide: “Arabs engage in typical Amalek behavior,” a proclivity to evil resonating with the ritual retelling of scripture; if the prominent Likud activist was unable to “prove this genetically,” he recognized “behavior of Amalek” demands destruction, even a destruction as that visited on the Amalekites by God.

 The reference to the Amalekites—who didn’t even exist!—offer the outlying example of acceptable conduct, even if it betrays the goal of being a “normal nation,” and casts Israel apart from normal nations, betraying its goal of being a normal nation—though what a normal nation is today is hard to know.  “Torah commands the Israelites to wage an eternal war against the nation of Amalek, and to wipe them out totally,” reads the current website of Chabad, arguing that theAmalekites are no longer a foreign nation, but “an internal enemy” who “wage a lethal war with our soul,” and must accordingly be annihilated. “Amalek unfortunately and definitely exists,” and the South African legal team accusing Israel of genocide at th International Court of Justice quoted the commandment to “erase the memory of Amalek” to convict Netanyahu of having plans for genocide, but another face of Amalek is identified as forgetfulness, and the casting of the Amalekites as not fixed in time, but “internal enemies of the Jewish people” from he Nazis in the twentieth century to Hamas today suggests the demand to recognize the survival of the Amalekites, and “never forget'” what threats they continue to embody. The rather timeless opposition that Netanyahu invoked served as a way to cast the global threat as an existential threat, not tied to contingent circumstances or the dispossession of land, but only as a form of pure evil.

The diffusion of the future of speech in Israeli politics cannot be overlooked as a part of Netanyahu’s long game denying boundaries and borders. Over a decade ago, a member of the National Religious Party saw collective guilt of all Palestinians as “creatures who came out of the depths of darkness,” who “we will have to kill,” they characterized them as Amalekites–a people needing extermination. They are people who know no borders, who are not nations, and who have no place in the Middle East if Israel is to belong to a world of nations. When the remarks of Netanyahu were glossed by 1 Samuel 15 in the American media, a divine order to “destroy Amalek entirely,” the prime minister’s office insisted news agency clarify the exact citation of Netanyahu’s speech to the Book of Deuteronomy; if both passages reference elimination of a people, the Prime Minister’s office insisted the Deuteronomic origins clarified the logic by which these Amalekites were especially dark vicious non-state actors–whose extermination was demanded as they had no place in the world of nations, as it was entirely foreign to it, but a f tribe–even if there is no evidence for the tribe–save as a place-holder of collective imagination and collective memory. The Deuteronomic origins of the mandate for destruction was not to “blot out the memory of Amalek,” but to dispose of the creatures of darkness of the Amalekites by the logic of the Israelites penal code of the lex talionis of Deuteronomy 19:21, “life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot”–as a law of retaliation, and of protecting humans from every threat to their lives, the Old Testament principle, not a historical narrative of kingship, but precept for brutally visiting punishments on a people out of respect for the value of human life.

While the refenrce to the Amalekites was a potent signifier in right wing politics of a collective memory that offered tools of living in the present, the figure of speech was no doubt readily recognized by the Palestinians in Hamas and Hezbollah as a declaration of war that disrespected borders, a contradictory evocation of a license to kill–a declaration of genocidal intent to remove the “ability to think like nation”–a group that was likened to a tribe, rather than a nation. The characterization was a terrifying explanation for justifying failure of adherence to international norms by a nation, and, perhaps, the license to act as a nation outside of national norms. The new norms for visiting destruction on the Amalekites was not in the handbook of national norms, but was a script that mandated a total destruction of borders, indeed, and a reversal of the idea of the border to a border zone of safety of military creation, of evacuation zones from the Gaza Envelope to the border zone of Southern Lebanon, zones whose destructiveness with no similarity to borders.

The ceasefire lines between Lebanon and Israel, if long established, were in a sense negated by the assassinations, if they were already allowed to be contested in the expansion The assassinations of Nasrallah and two successors to his leadership–“Nasrallah himself and Nasrallah’s replacement, and the replacement of the replacement,” as Netanyahu crowed, sewed leadership chaos as a means to redraw Israel’s Northern border, even if it contravened international law. Netanyahu openly threatened Beirut stood at the abyss of “a long war that will lead to destruction and suffering like we see in Gaza,” on the anniversary of Hamas’ invasion of Israel, as four heavily armored divisions of Israeli troops filled southern Lebanon, destroying villages and burned thousands of hectares of farmland in Southern Lebanon, in a rewriting of the map that raised the specter that the nation no longer able to feed itself, seeking to destabilize the entire nation to pursue its ends of remapping the dynamics of power in the Middle East. Much as the Israeli Prime Minister hoped to “evacuate the whole Gaza Strip in coordination with the Egyptian government,” the hope of normalizing the expunging non-state actors from the future map of the Middle East was a “plan for the resettlement and humanitarian rehabilitation of the entire Arab population in the Gaza Strip which aligns well with the economic and geopolitical interests of Israel, Egypt, the USA, and Saudi Arabia,” remapping of national interests that expunged non-state actors from the map.

Netanyahu was addressing a press conference after addressing the General Assembly in New York, but the military planning of the assassination demand a reexamination of the maps Netanyahu had presented to the United Nations General Assembly–long involved in the negotiation of Lebanon’s southern border–and the maps by which we understand what was treated as a border conflict has become a map that expanded to what might be call a border zone, if not to create a demilitarized zone or a “dead zone” in ways far more literal and apocalyptic than the rhetoric of Nasrallah or Netanyahu had used. In arguing to Beirut’s residents “We’re not at war with you. We’re at war with Hezbollah, which has hijacked your country and threatens to destroy ours,” as meaning “Israel has no choice. … Israel must defeat Hezbollah,” the mushroom-cloud image of destruction that began in the evening and sent massive clouds smoldering sent a plume over Beirut in dawn hours and early morning rocked underground Beirut suburbs, demanded residents evacuate southern Beirut, blaming Lebanon for having allowed the transit of munitions from Iran to arrive in civil airports of Beirut, and continuing to target buildings housing munitions across southern Lebanon and Beirut.

September 27, 2024/Hassan Ammar/AP

The delayed reaction bombs entered the buildings to explode, creating a devastating if targeted damage by their pinpoint accuracy, striking Hezbollah commanders. Nasrallah had been tracked for twenty years, killing the head of Hezbollah, his successor, and close circle of commanders in an underground compound, is an illustration of frustration at inability to define the prolonged war at its borders. The strike across borders raised questions of violating international law, and of legal munitions, but eerily evoked a divine sort of justice.

The pinpoint strike at the circle it blamed for plotting attacks on Israel shifted the long war on its borders to an urbanized area: Nasrallah had angrily condemned how the planting of explosives on Hezbollah’s pagers and walkie-talkies for having “crossed all red lines,” and “broken all the rules,” as it had issued a virtual “declaration of war” by flying supersonic planes over Beirut, buzzing the headquarters of Nasrallah as if taking a reconnaissance flight over targets of later bombed. The final televised address he made condemned the aggression of the strikes airplanes made on Lebanon’s territory, coordinating a set of explosions across the entire nation of Lebanon, as if to alert the leader and of Hezbollah of the possibility of an Israeli strike at any site in Lebanon–a television appearance curious for how the Sayyed was instant on the bounds of Lebanon.

This can be seen as a declaration of war,' Nasrallah says as Israeli Jets  Fly Low Ov

September 19, 2024

The the coordinated air attack that sent columns of smoke into the night air crossed those lines even more emphatically and spectacularly, revealing the precision mapping of the targets with a rather awesome if terrifying sophistication, suggesting a sort of divine wrath by dual guidance bombs that exploded eighty 2,000 lb bombs after they entered the four buildings, sending a fireball into the night sky, after residents were asked to evacuate all buildings that held “Hezbollah facilities and interests,” in a protocol of warning that has become standard to shield the civilians of the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon.

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (left) and Chief of Staff Lt. General Halevi (center) watch the September 27, 2024 Attack in underground Israeli Air Force Command Center near Tel Aviv/Ariel Hermoni/Defense Ministry

But the strike that was monitored closely from Israeli Air Force Command Centers in Tel Aviv, show how the security of Israel’s borders knew no limits. The war begun as a defense of Israel’s boundaries was presented as neither in cities or Lebanese territory, but against the infiltration of Hezbollah, a non-state actor, deep underground in Lebanon.

Explosions over Southern Beirut of September 27 Bombing of Southern Beirut Spread over the City/AFP

President Joe Biden, an honest man, declared “his death from an Israeli airstrike . . . a measure of justice for his many victims, including Americans, Israelis, and Lebanese civilians,” the statement issued September 28, insisting he had no advance warning of the strike, but calling the death “welcome” even if it may well destabilize the region. While his Defense Secretary had spoken with Israeli allies about using the bunker busters only as the operation had begun and was already underway, Israeli official described Netanyahu’s address of the UN General Assembly amidst escalating fighting with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon as a ploy and “part of a diversion” to lull Hassan Nasrallah into believing in his safety, the open rejection of any hope for diplomatic resolution of the ongoing border conflict ramped into new gear as the aim was revealed “for threats to Israel to be removed.”

Bombed Compound in Beirut Suburb, Dahiyeh, September 28, 2024/AFP

The assassination, timed after multiple unsuccessful attempts to locate the hostages of August 7 or protect its victims from attack, was based on tracking the senior chain of command of attacks on Israeli citizens, as if dropping at least sixty bunker buster bombs equipped with precision guidance systems–bunker-busters able to penetrate deep underground and flatten built structures–killing Nasrallah and much Hezbollah elite was a just strike. Nasrallah had been long targeted by Israeli forces, after being tracked by radioactive material placed on his palm in a friendly handshake, ageolocation of a man long underground was able to offer inside intelligence. Ten days after a spate of terrifying explosion of thousands of pagers booby trapped with explosives across Lebanon in the hands of Hezbollah commanders on September 17, and walkie-talkies on the following day, had compelled a meeting of commanders, the strike in Beirut’s suburbs revealed terrifying vulnerability of once-secure borders. The border treaties suddenly destabilized with the jackpot of killing believed the senior chain of command planning “terrorist activities against the citizens of Israel” as if to legalize the strike, by preemptively eroding the borders of a zone of conflict across Lebanon.

Borders were the center of Nasrallah’s active engagement in the military, defending Lebanon as a frontier. Nasrallah had long claimed the resistance of the “oppressed people of Palestine” would triumph even over a nuclear powered Israeli army, preached the power of on the ground resistance to any military force. And the explosion of pagers on Lebanon’s territory violated “all red lines” in its brazen violation of the integrity of territoriality, the arrival of bunker busters in a residential neighborhood suggested even more completely the absence of respect for sovereign lines. Indeed, if the disputed borders in the world of territorial disputes are widely spread–

Territorial Disputes in the World, 2024

–the focus of territorial disputes in the Middle East were intensely linked, with firing cross-border rockets from Lebanon as the Gaza War began, or after the Al Aqsa invasion, and the rockets of reprisal Israel fired at underground tunnels for assembling rocket launchers in southern Lebanon.

Territorial Disputes in Mediterranean Theater and Middle East, 2024

The intensity of arial bombs that were three times the force as used in the Iraq War suggested a massive show of force. Yet the long disputed border in which Nasrallah had essentially dedicated his life–inviting Iranian arms into the longstanding dispute on the border with Israel, daring Israeli forces to enter Lebanon or Lebanese lands, seeing each village as the basis for defying Israeli arms, after having expelled Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000, while wearing the black turban of a Sayyed, or descendant of Mohammed, had declared the imminent arrival of a moment of reckoning, had avoided assassination for more than a decade, but the onslaught of precision bombs offered a near-apocalyptic ending for his life, as much as a precision strike.

Americans might wonder at the use of bombs of this strength in an urban area. The strike targeted the rapid expansion of rockets supplied by Iran to arm Hezbollah–estimated with 150,000 missiles, drones, and rockets, over ten-fold what it possessed at the end of the 2006 war. The current explosion matched attempts to stop the smuggling arms to Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen–a black cloud hovering above the region that Benjamin Netanyahu, having approved the massive strike, showed the UN as “The Curse” of the modern Middle East. While “A few years ago, I stood here with a red marker to show the curse, a great curse, the curse of a nuclear Iran,” the return of “The Curse” on the eve of the assassination of Nusrallah seemed a cause for celebration. In a sense, the map was a smoke screen and distraction from the invasion of Lebanon’s frontier, ignoring national sovereignty and laws of sending bunker-busters in inhabited areas or military targets near them: but the “lumping” of nations opposed to Israel’s borders–Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Houthi non-state–as if it was the mushroom cloud portentously spreading above the entire Middle East–

Map Displayed to U.N. General Assembly, September 27, 2024

–that his precision strike hoped to end. The map masked how the bombing was a transgression of international norms. Israel had undertaken in targeting the leader of Hezbollah for three decades, but finally did so in ways Netanyahu seemed to offer an explanation, if one that was not logical in any way. “The Curse” evoked a Neo-scriptural justification of the precision strike already planned against Nusrallah and underway, as pinpoint bunker-busters had left to strike at a link at the heart of the black cloud hovering over the Middle East–Iran’s man in Lebanon, who had been firing rockets across the northern border of Israel with considerable annoyance over the past year.

Sick of the involvement of Iran in non-state actors in the Middle East, the Prime Minister ended his press conference in New York quite abruptly as he was informed the strikes had been achieved, not taking any questions. The massive show of force intensified cross-border rocket attacks at northern Israel and reprisals preceding Nasrallah’s assassination blurred a border drawn on the ground, relegated to a relic of the past. To affirm the integrity of Israel’s borders, the planes flouted the sovereign space of Lebanon, at great costs to seeing Israel as a “normal” nation among nations, sending a two thousand pound bunker-buster bomb agains the man they had tracked for years, but now claimed, using a word that had its Old English origins before 1150 to cast an anathema on the forces of non-state actors that threatened Israel’s borders, and in his eyes threatened a global order: if the map was more of a news map, a backdrop of a television news show of the 1990s rather than a map of any granular resonance,–or that reflected actual mapping technologies the Israeli Air Force was using at the very same time to kill Nasrallah asNetanyahu finished his address.

The map conjured the scale of an anathema that existed in the present more associated with the occult or medieval origins–if recently revived in Harry Potter–to conjure excommunication from the world of nations, or the church, the opposite of a blessing of a future of peace. Was there not an intentional similarity of this dark map of the Iranian state’s infiltration of non-state actors to the remapping of the Middle East in maps that circulated online a decade earlier, in 2014, allegedly depicting the world domination sought by ISIS, a mashup of earlier maps, as a curse, to evoke a perspective restoration of a Caliphate that might bridge Iraq, Syria, and Iran, up to Vienna? The map emerged online, an emblem of fear paired with the change of ISIS’ name to “the Islamic State,” and pronounced its leader to be the caliph, or the global leader of Islam–and seems a projection (so to speak!) of the fears of an actual caliphate bent on global conquest–as a pseudo-Stalinist “Five Year Plan” that seemed to broker a resurrection of an early modern version of a global Cold War–“a chilling plan for global domination” per the Daily Mail–was the original image of a global threat.

Although the purported “five year plan” of the Islamic State made runs as “showing their plans for the next five years” on American television networks, eager to find a new image of global divides–

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False Mashup of Islamic Hopes for a New Caliphate, Twitter circa July, 2014

–themashup of online extremists, based on a hundred year old map of an imagined Caliphate, was an old recycled map, rather than designs for global domination. If versions included India and Bangladesh for good measure as a counterweight to Europe, it sought to conjure fears of barbarians at the gates of Europe, a sort of expansive vision of a Fall of Constantinople to barbarian hordes, to which Netanyahu’s September 2024 map of the “The Curse” made some weird reference. This was the global threat that the bombing of Beirut was serving to puncture or thwart.

Maps stoking fears of the spread of Sunni extremism were amped as the Islamic State as a miasma spread across an expanded Middle East, destabilizing the post-Cold War New World Order with a near global reach. The specter stood behind the map Netanyahu brought on September 27, 2024 was itself a massive exaggeration of the fragmented pockets of Sunni terrorism, per the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, yet the cartographic mashup activated a potent emblem of fear, circulating quite widely as a haunting of the Middle East that seemed destined to spread to the EU.

1. When Netanyahu claimed that Hezbollah–and Iran–constituted a global threat “able to terrorize the world,” he was magnifying his own perspective on the world, and elevating the strike of Israel’s Air Force to a global intervention of its own. The strike was a bonanza in geolocation, a payload that seemed a jackpot against Hezbollah after a year of deepest frustration. After Nasrallah had charged Israel “violated all red lines”–not only the so-called “blue line” that marked the border of Lebanon since 1948–as it blew past the militarized borders in an unprecedented firepower claiming legitimacy, as if visiting a divine judgment on a man who has long preached the destruction of Israel in Messianic terms. It revisited the apocalyptic rhetoric of Nasrallah on himself and his inner circle, as if to reclaim a rhetoric of divine judgment and wrath at the violation of Israel’s borders.

Banner of Nasrallah’s Turbaned Head Held on Religious Procession in Beirut, July 2023

Mourner of Nasrallah’s Death in Iran

Yet the Prime Minister who ordered the bombing tried to make the case of its necessity, even if it removed Israel from ceasefire or peace process. In contrast to the regional the maps Netanyahu had displaced before of Israeli frontiers, he bought a map of an expanded Middle East to the United Nations of alternative future geopolitical scenarios, Israel’s incursions of the border to “limited, localized, and targeted ground raids” against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the tonnes of bombs seemed to se disarray in a “militant infrastructure” of Hezbollah on the eve of the first invasion of Lebanon’s border for eighteen years. The presence of Hezbollah among residential areas–per Netanyahu, in late September 2024, “a missile in every kitchen, a rocket in every garage” merited returning Lebanon, per Yoav Gallant, “back into the Stone Age,” in June, 2024, if a diplomatic solution does not present itself. As journalists are for the first time invited into Southern Lebanon, to witness the degradation of Hezbollah in villages across the border, achieved by airstrikes, artillery and raids, the invasion past UN demarcation lines revealed weapons caches, Kalashnikov rifles, artillery, hand grenades, and mortar shells, designed to stage an invasion of Israel, to disable all remaining offensive capacities of the terror group by the end of the first weeks of October, 2024.

But the IDF had already made its presence known. If the walkie talkie and pagers exploded to injure faces and arms of many, the attempt to cut off the head of Hezbollah was designed to send shocks across the system. The sudden shock of pagers long used as they were believed possible to avoid geolocation in their lack of sensors seemed a magic trick of sorts: “we are everywhere, and we can strike you anywhere,” able to strike in the web of the secret militant organization under Nasrallah’s eyes, troubling his sense of control. He did not know that he had been tracked for some time–a trackable substance being placed on his palm in a handshake in Iran or Saudi Arabia or Beirut, per Saudi news, placing him in the building complex.

Deep underground beneath an anonymous apartment complex outside Beirut, the long-hidden Nasrallah, nemesis of the Israeli state determined to undermine the Peace Process for three decades, was as vulnerable as a sitting duck by a massive explosion–unable to hide longer. His death at sixty-four cut short a fiery leader of thirty years, offering stunning confirmation soon following Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration of what seems an ultimatum to the United Nation’s, not revealing or tipping his hand about operations that were by then already underway, “We will not accept a terror army perched on our northern border able to perpetrate another Oct 7-style massacre.” The “limited” operation seems a way of expanding an occupation of the region Hezbollah has long worked and based its infrastructure of rockets and missile launchers from the south of Lebanon, as it has attempted almost forty years ago to root out the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon in 1982.

The explosions of low-tech pagers and walkie-talkies did not rely on geolocating sensors–but revealed the hidden reach of Israeli Defense Forces into the organization. Panicked at hearing rumors and buzz of an attack, Nasrallah instructed Hezbollah members to rid themselves of phones, bury them or put them in lock boxes, back in February as compromised–“I tell you that the phone in your hands, in your wife’s hands, and in your children’s hands is the [compromised] agent.” He had heard rumors on intelligence lines for the planning of the attack that would render his forces vulnerable in new ways. The operation had been planned for over twenty years, the result of outrage at the border war. Nusrallah had concealed himself for eighteen years, shunning public appearances since 2006 war, aware he was targeted, was a victory of mapping, as much as inside informants. The blast of eighty tons of bombs that followed in quite dramatic fashion based on real-time intelligence triangulated a quarry long sought in a dramatic blast of thunder from above. The Hezbollah leader had been shaped by the Israeli invasions of Lebanon, religiously trained in a Shia mosque in Iraq, combined liberation theology and apocalyptic imagery to articulate a charismatic vision of the struggle non-state actors suited to wage against Israel in his customary black turban and brown robe. After remote assassination by cel of a Hamas bomb-maker in 1996, he grew rightly wary of remote devices able as keys revealing the location of soldiers, in danger of lifting a needed veil of institutional secrecy to his enemy. The planting of timed explosives in walkie-talkies and pagers evaded his justified suspicions of mobile networks, but penetrated deeply into his infrastructure.

Reported Locations of Surprise Explosion of Pagers and Walkie Talkies across Lebanon, September 16-17, 2024

The shock of the exploding pagers staged a cross-border assault of brazen intrusion and infiltration that suggested the intensity of the war no longer about the contested border of Lebanon, or the range of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but the open wide nature of war.

Indeed, these exploding pagers were but the prelude to a new state in cross-border infiltration and attack, a long designed operation of which the supply chain infiltration in pagers–in which explosives were inserted as they waiting to be shipped to Lebanon–was the first escalation of cross-border strikes. The strikes that maimed some 1,500 fighters from September 17-18 set the stage for the bombing of the complex in which Nasrallah summit had called a device-free summit in Beirut, to plan future attacks against Israel, to open a needed window in which Hezbollah’s arsenal might be strategically dismantled in Lebanon. Overriding desire to find hidden underground leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas across jurisdictional borders has prioritized problems of cross-border tracking as well as of evasion.

The increased sophistication of strategic tracking became paramount in ways that cannot be explained by the boundaries of the Middle East and the Israeli state since its founding in 1948, even if Israel’s boundaries are defended as having the authority and legitimacy of a scriptural covenant. With boundaries this intensely in need of defense and guarding, how can Israel be a normal nation, or a nation like all other nations, when it is dependent on firm borders to exist? Are the barriers that were built around Israel–and the concrete barrier along the “Blue Line” of withdrawal in the north, the divide from Lebanon, a sign of strength to be defended, or of weakness, isolating the nation from its neighbors, even if the hope is to live peaceably with them? Is not the northern border with Lebanon, more than the border of Gaza across which Hamas charged on October 7, the more dangerous border on which IDF forces have focussed in the previous decade? The completion of the barrier of border fences that were completed by the one hundred and fifty mile frontier fence between the Sinai and Negev deserts in the south of Israel, leaving only the barrier between Jordan and the Dead Sea without a physical border barrier, were claimed necessary deterrents against terrorism, complete with the thirty-two mile barrier with Gaza that Hamas insurgents pierced on October 7, 2023, including the new wall planned around Metullah in the north.

Border Barriers Constructed around Israel, 2012

The maps that Netanyahu brought to the United Nations General Assembly as the attack on booby-trapped walkie talkies and pager was underway was crude, if to the point–not of nations, or of states, but of “The Curse” that had afflicted his nation–as if to conceal this was a war of stateless–positing the true dark nemesis that was the “curse” of dark forces that threatened Israel’s existence and had in fact animated the distraction–absent from this map–of the Gaza War–there was no Gaza, no Palestine, no West Bank, but a true menacing black cloud without “true” borders. The black expanse almost surrounding Israel is identified only as an anathema–“The Curse”–to suggest what has been mapped predominantly as an issue of territorial jurisdiction is a spiritual, temporal, and even existential evil. Challenging his audience to open the “black box” of threats Israel faces is perhaps the only way to appreciate the operations already in the process of being launched into Lebanon’s sovereign capital, as four planes bearing bunker blaster that would soon be on their way to bomb apartment complexes in Beirut.

The dropping of a hundred “munitions,” dropped by bombers over Beirut every two seconds in a stunning precision, erased any trace of the commanders of Hezbollah in ways that were hoped to clear the board to remake the map of the Middle East and northern Israel, yet again. The black cloud of accursed enemies of Israel–Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and the Houthis–were not only the sources of increased missiles attacks on Israel,–was shown as a transnational alliance, intimating if not mapping the constellation of state, semi-state, and non-state actors supported by Iran as a destabilizing agent of regional instability, united with allies, as the audience of nations of the General Assembly understood, to undermine the presence of the United States influence and indeed a UN presence in the Middle East.

Netanyahu Addresses the United Nations General Assembly, September 27, 2024

The black transnational “curse” stretching from Lebanon to Iran exposed an unconventional alliance hardly in need of mapping. It made the link implicit in the vengeance strike that would arrive later the next day in Beirut as a strike of vengeance akin to of a deity, although he didn’t say so. As if announcing the traditional role of an ancient king of Israel to “break the power of the wicked,” by the state prerogatives of defense akin more to a Law of Kings of Israel than grasped by the law of sovereign states. This ruler of the state stands in place of the king. Indeed, as the message of Samuel to Saul, Israel’s king, that he punish the Amalekites for “what they did in opposition the Israelites when they came up out of Egypt” to the land of Canaan, that lead Saul to “utterly destroy all the people with the edge of the sword” [1 Samuel 15.8] in a central “genocide narrative” in which the Israelites received the divine sanction to wipe out an entire people by a “holy war” over a sacred space, not necessarily believing or even lending credence to biblical legend but ramping up the shows of force against non-state actors to a level historical inevitability of the acceptance of the unending presence of a state of Israel in the Middle East. Rather than occupying merely a story of the legends of ancient tribal heroes–Samuel or Saul–the Book of Judges–that suggest a story of the regaining of the spiritual destiny of the Jewish people, the origins of the legend of the Amalekites that Netanyahu’s office reminded American press agencies belonged to Dueteronomy, the sacred and most deep-lying legal codes of the Jewish people, from a time of their deep tie to God, rather than the Babylonian period or Roman period or a lamentational prayers to God as a righteous judge.

The maps Netanyahu carried to the United Nations was not a map of boundaries, but a haunting of the Middle East with anathema. The ongoing presence of a malignant “curse” of proxies was a continuation of the Amalekites, in some sense; it helped to make the state of Israel difficult to see as a normal state, as it could not be understood by a map of boundaries and their defense: the map of the black blot that spread as a dark cloud across the Middle East from Iran, even if this was not identified, was paired duo with “The Blessing,” as a theological or exegetical map, masking as a geopolitical map. It invited member-states of the General Assembly to take sides while they still could, in order to stop gathering clouds of an end to peace sponsoring terrorist organizations dedicated to Israel’s distruction. The map Netanyahu presented to the UN General Assembly, after he had given the go-ahead to the bombing of the bunker where the Hezbollah leader was sequestered. This killing might dismantle the anti-Israeli Axis of Resistance, Netanyahu hoped, diminishing anti-Israeli forces in the region and ending the threat to his northern border. It was a map that was not designed for American audiences in particular, but its display, combined with news of the assassination in progr4ss, led increasing American forces to be stationed in the Middle East, as ceasefire negotiations continued, was a smokescreen to the incursions of Lebanon’s border.

Arrival of Amp[lified United States Strike Groups in the Middle East, October 1 2024

These new forces were off the map, a bit jarringly, as Netanyahu somewhat blandly compared the options for the community of nations in his address to an almost empty chamber in New York on a late Friday afternoon. Speaking five days into the launch of the attacks across the northern border into Lebanon, the map of the Middle East was a blunt refusal to recognize international pressure for a ceasefire, and a refusal of the two-state solution establishing Palestine as a “normal” nation, as the Israeli Defense Forces were given the directive to “continue fighting at full force” to protect its borders amidst a map of such looming existential threats.

The paired maps offered a rhetorical smokescreen, a counter-map to the question of the conflict on Lebanon’s southern border, on the eve airplanes were sent over Beirut’s night skies drop bunker-busters that would kill Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, and justify the pummeling of cross-border attacks on residential communities in southern Lebanon, where Israel has argued Hezbollah is entrenched as a proxy for Iran. The map was launched in response to Hezbollah’s cross-border attacks to protest the invasion of Gaza, but the map Netanyahu brought to the General Assembly this year neither showed Gaza or the West Bank or military operations of that invasion. The speech was not performative, but a stubborn tenacity to a map that might later be understood to justify the hope that a planned ground invasion of Lebanon would reconfigure the map of the Middle East in the long run. It was a smokescreen not to look closely at Lebanon’s border–or a summons of a sort of shadow-diplomacy to send quickly more American reinforcements to the Middle East.

Netanyahu had given approval to the assassination of Nusrallah with bunker-buster bombs shortly before he addressed the United Nations on September 27, and his use of maps as visual aids in a speech that commanded less attention than his previous addresses of the General Assembly can be seen only in the context of the surgical strike he knew already underway half way across the world.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Addresses United Nations General Assembly/September 27, 2024

Netanyahu set the map of “The Cures” off against an alternative vision of a far rosier sense of the future, the map of “The Curse” rhetorically presented, as if diverging roads in a wood, a stark choice of the world between alliances, as if a compare and contrast question for High School art history. The black block of nations that were seen as agents of Iran perhaps addressed an Israeli public as a message of resolve, and in part addressing Iran, with the declaration that, with attacks of increased firepower in Lebanon underway, that the crude superficial maps depicted a reality that “There is no place in Iran that the long arm of Israel cannot reach, and that’s true of the entire Middle East.” There was of course no monopoly that Netanyahu had on apocalyptic visions–they were central to Nasrallah’s oratory and his own political thought, if it can be called that, and his motivational calls for the role of Hezbollah in the Middle East as an agent of destruction.

But it was also a map for the American public and an attempt to rebuff the possibility of negotiation or a ceasefire in a war that was fundamentally for the world’s future. The global map of Manicahean alternatives was a map of theological dimensions, delivering two ways Israel could be integrated in the community of nations. The pressing importance of the potential constellation of alliances between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and India illustrated a de facto annexation of Gaza and the West Bank as if this were the starting point of negotiations, and the reality that Iran was isolated and contained as a nuclear power by the alliances he showed in green. But if the map of “The Curse” of the current geopolitical landscape that Israel faced in the Middle East, it hardly presented Israel as a normal state; far from it, the rhetoric of vengeance of the current map threaten to recast it as a a pariah state. Although the mapper maps projected the deep isolation Israel felt. It failed in its attempt to visually communicate the pressing urgency Netanyahu (and Israel) both felt at the need to act alone, even in the face of the broad condemnation of Israel’s invasion of Palestinian lands in the Gaza War as the air raids on Beirut unfolded. Perhaps the shift from the map of Israel secure behind borders in a “new Middle East” Netanyahu held up in 2023 before the General Assembly,–offering no mention of Lebanon, as a new regional alignment just before the October 7 invasion–

Map Netanyahu Displayed to the UN General Assembly of “The New Middle East,” September 22, 2023

–secure behind the barriers constructed to defend its borders, including between Lebanon and Israel, that preserved Israel as cosseted in a super-national of regional consensus on its autonomy as a state. Israeli independence was recognized without qualification in “The New Middle East” he invited the General Assembly to visualize. That global perspective may have been unexpected, from a nation that has been focussed on barrier walls, but was not asking them to visualize peace. The map is an open affront to the General Assembly, eliminating non-state actors in a community of nations, and mapping the nemeses of the Israeli state against a trans-border entity that the Assembly’s failure to comprehend could not be expected–it didn’t seem likely given that it was cast “a swamp of antisemitic bile” from which Israel was increasingly quite desperately left isolated.

Netanyahu had deployed a different infographic–a ticking bomb!–to demand in 2012 the General Assembly recognize “a clear red line” about Iran’s nuclear program, as if addressing kindergartners by declaratives such as “This is a fuse” and “This is a bomb,” to demand nations adopt “a clear red line on uranium enrichment” for the future of the world, not Israel’s future–for nuclear weapons “in the hands of the most dangerous regime” would become corrupted “by the lust of violence”–we must prevent Iran’s access to a final stage of access to high enriched uranium, that would allow the Iranians to complete a true bomb to which it was per open data 70% of the way to possessing–

–and, he grimly concluded, allow Iran, a rogue nation, to arrive at full possession a nuclear bomb–

Netanyahu Addresses U.N. General Assembly on September 26, 2012

–that Netanyahu used a sharpie to prevent, beseeching the United Nations a decade ago force Iran to “back down” not only from introducing nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but upset the balance of power in which Netanyahu claimed he sought to “forge a durable peace with the Palestinians” that had long been elusive, implicitly blaming Iran as the chief bad actor to ongoing crucial process of peace negotiations to secure the recognition of a Jewish state of Israel. Netanyahu used public reports of the possession of enriched uranium, but turned to cartographic props in later years to describe Iran not only as enemies of Israel, but enemies of God, like the very Amalekites who it was the duty of the Jewish people to wipe and eliminate (Deut. 25:17-19), as they were of an order of evil and threshold of wickedness that demanded to be contained, Netanyahu has relentlessly, and per formatively turned to maps to erase occupied territories and Gaza, but imply, as his cartoon bomb, the fear Iran would enhance Hezbollah’s ability to strike targets in Israel.

Netanyahu Iran

The map seemed revised “Greater Israel” transcending its borders to a threatened nation, aspiring to normalcy, but threatened by the non-state actors tied to Iran, the “threat” or curse in a region where boundaries and borders made no sense. Netanyahu paradoxically condescendingly lectured the community of nations at the meeting of the 79th General Assembly to defend Israel’s conduct in war, without saying so, mapping the transnational ties that had become a threat from the perspective of an isolated country. This was the deepest reality Iran must understand, the states of the world must recognize it was impossible to tolerate any longer, and the reason for the border wars he was about to launch with increased intensity. The violence of the attacks, he seemed to be saying, or apparent violation of international law were the least of the world’s real concerns. The remainder of this post is concerned with mapping of the threats to Israeli sovereignty, the mapping of the borders of Lebanon that Israel invaded, and the question of mapping the future of the nation. When he returned to the United Nations on 22 September, 2023, no doubt enraging Palestinians in the audience, he displayed the future “New Middle East” with no Palestinian presence visible–

–in ways that this blog has linked to the invasion two weeks later of Israel in the Al Aqsa Raids, named after the old mosque in East Jerusalem whose presence was recently closed to Palestinians. That performative use of the map of a bucolic “green” future appropriated the green banner of Palestinians for a “New Middle East” that suggested a community of nations poised to recognize the legitimacy of Israel in 2023–Egypt; Sudan; Saudi Arabia; Bahrain–that appeared to welcome Israel as a “normal” nation in a map of clearly drawn borders.

The strikes on Lebanon, he seemed to say, were the “domestic policy” of a “normal” nation. But the increased scale of the bombing raids that followed Nasrallah’s violent death under Israeli bombs led to a massive attempt to degrade the strength of Hezbollah on a region not imaginable before, providing a massive launching of air raids across southern Lebanon, focusing on the area below the Litany River in the southern part of the country, but extending up to the area below the Awali, the two proxies for the agreed lack of a border of Lebanon, as if to compel the United Nations and international community to accept the borders of Hezbollah’s presence in the nation and in the Middle East. The folks at “Understanding War” provided a far more sanitized image of the localized strikes that Israel had taken of cities or villages south Sidon, as well as just outside of Beirut–where they destroyed the compound of buildings where Nasrallah was meeting operatives of Hezbollah–including reconnaissance and observation points of the Israeli territory in the Golan Heights, based on local Lebanese reporting, that seemed destined to “degrade” the force of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The demand for such a degrading of the border zone emerged as a logical response to waves of rocket attacks on Israel, mostly on IDF positions and an attempt on the Mossad headquarters outside Tel Aviv, the later fired in response to the bunker blasters that killed Nasrallah on September 27. The flurry of cross-border bombs can offer some clarity on a war that was still being called “focussed,” “targeted,” and “delimited” but appeared intended to secure a sense of lasting violation of borders and sovereign integrity, and to reassert its control of the area south of Sidon.

Capacities of Hezbollah Missiles Striking Deep within Israel/BBC, via CSIS, AFP/October 1, 2024

To a certain extent, the targeting of the southern third of Lebanon made little tactical sense, with missiles of considerable precision no reaching not only a forty kilometer rang of Katyushas, but the seventy-five km range of Fajr-5 missiles, the Iranian made long-range multiple launch rockets named after the morning prayer, first developed in the 1990s. modernized with GPS guidance in 2017, or the two hundred and ten km Zelzal-2 long range unguided rocket–Persian for “Earthquake”–which promises an enhanced level of local destruction upon impact, but also offers far less precision, but the Israeli precision strikes seemed surgically elegant, but seem to respond to the increased accuracy of short-range missiles, and the hope of removing the threat of cross-border strikes of increased velocity and defined by “more accurate, more precise, multidirectional fire” for the past six years of increasing chances and worries of cross-border war, in many ways more salient than the Gaza Strip had ever been in the previous decade, per the IDF’s former chief of operations.

Vulnerability of Israeli cities to Syrian-Made and Iran-Made Missiles/GIS Reports Online, 2018

From October 2023 to July, 2024, there were over 2,295 rocket attacks on Northern Israel, displacing many, but over a far more limited range than the study of Syrian rocket ranges revealed, mostly confined with in 20 km of the armistice line, and few beyond 30 km of the border, designed the abilities of Syrian and Russian long-range missiles, whose use was understandably restrained–the greatest majority within but 2.5 km of the border, and 94.3% within half a kilometer of the border.

Attacks on Israeli Territory, October 8, 2023-July 1, 2024/ALMA

Netanyahu seems to have won Americans go-ahead for “for dismantling [Hezbollah’s] attack infrastructure along the border,” assurances bolstered when US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin “reaffirmed US support for Israel’s right to defend itself against Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and other Iran-backed terrorist organizations.” Although Hezbollah had no intent to withdraw from the border, viewing its fostering of a “resistance society” as a prelude for the collective annihilation of the Israeli state, if not the annihilation of Jews that suggested defense was only possible by all-out war. While the lame duck American President bravely held out hope for a ceasefire, the war on the border had raged for weeks, and wouldn’t stop soon. In launching fireballs and incendiaries with trebuchets and from missiles, a border war of new intensity and scale had emerged for which Gaza may have been a rehearsal, and the purported choices of two maps–a “blessing” of alliances and a “curse” of Iranian proxies’ victory–is itself a smokescreen.

Or was the map not only a smokescreen, but demands to be taken seriously as a counter-map of the maps of bombing raids that he at this point knew were imminent, and underway? The deployment of the bunker-busters was not taken light heartedly and without much internal debate with members of his cabinet; the blast that seemed a veritable hand of God and strike of death for the elite commanders of Hezbollah and their General Secretary was sought to be explained, before it happened, by the lamentation of the situation in which Israel found itself. The map provided a “message for Teheran” Netanyahu had traveled to New York to bring–“if you strike us, we will strike you “–invoked the absence of borders, opening a window to escalation or a imminent missile strikes from Iran threaten. No magic marker was required, or any clear rhetorical hectoring of his audience–he seemed now heavy lidded and quite tired as he spoke to the General Assembly, with full foreknowledge of his order to send the bombing strike that would assassinate Nassrallah in his hiding place. The visual aids keyed to a language of biblical derivation, oddly misplaced on the modern geopolitical situation of Israel, was a language of self-preservation and of flattery–Indian media seemed a bit overjoyed it had been identified as “The Blessing,” irrespective of the dark side of these visual aids–the “dumb” map of the political dilemmas of the Middle East evoked the very biblical terms in which he had cast his retributive strikes on Gaza, and would now strike Beirut.

September 22, 2034

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Filed under border barriers, boundaries, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah, Israel

Afghanistan and the Tools of War

The haunting GIF in the header to this post tracks the rapid return of the Taliban to power as a drawdown of the Forever War. It echoes a sense of inevitable loss–a dramatic ceding of territory, echoing the “loss” of Korea, China, or Vietnam–an un-imagined conclusion to the War on Terror. The terrifying denouement of a collapse of provinces across this virtual Afghanistan seems to suggest a logic deflating bravura of the Forever Wars, in which arms and military materiel were funneled at unprecedented rate to Afghanistan–at a rate that would only be later superseded by the rush of arms into Ukraine. This was hardly, the GIF suggests, the conclusion Americans would have expected from Donald Trump’s promise to “ending the era of endless wars,” but was the end of an era of pretenses to American empire, that sent hundreds of billions of military spending to Afghanistan, inflating the budget for the Department of Defense in unsustainable fashion, and, intentionally suggests an ominous terms a haunting pivot to an unknown future without imperial plans. This is a future where the return of military forces from Afghanistan will upset a global military playing field, where war will no longer be fought in terms of a map of Afghanistan or a level field.

But if the glass can be called half-empty or half-full, its apparently overpowering logic of loss also obscures, by flattening to a few months the long history of post-9/11 period, how wars waged since 2001 has left the United States without any control over the ground game. For by failing to find allies in the ground we’ve been pummeling , unsuccessfully seeking to construct alliances on the ground, the arrival of arms and military technologies have re-written the situation of Afghanistan, or the conflict there in which we were long immersed, in ways few Americans have any memory, and surely won’t be aided in the dramatic GIF that suggests the collapse of the house of cards on which we created a power vacuum filled with only intensified high-powered arms, in what was virtually a powder keg of massive American forces across the Middle East, in an extended military apparatus designed to keep a geo-political map afloat that had no endgame or even game.

It is hard to come to terms with the 9/11 wars without tracking the flow of military technology and tools overseas. Over 9,000 Americans have died, or the hundreds of thousands who returned from the wars, injured in body or psyche, the roughly 6,200 U.S. military personnel, contractors, humanitarian workers and journalists killed in Afghanistan since the U.S. government invaded are left off the map, but the legacy may be greatest for the huge amounts of military materiel shipped into the Middle East–arms that helped in some way to “modernize” the current Taliban, who may have received training from Pakistan intel–as well as the huge losses of population and infrastructure in Afghanistan, where about 71,000 Pakistani and Afghan civilians are estimated to have been killed–a staggeringly disproportionate number in crossfire, bombing raids, drone attacks, suicide bombings in Kabul and other bases, IED’s and night-time raids by NATO or American troops.

The GiF that purports to document the effects of American withdrawal renders the battlefield of Afghanistan as the rapid falling of provinces as if they were a gameboard, or a mock battlefield, creating a sense of causation due to American withdrawl by the proverbial falling of a set of dominoes. But the limited long-term strategy of these wars is handily elided in what seems the result of an immediate retreat of military presence. The retreat was, however, only the last act of a tragedy on a massive scale, the result of funneling arms rather than promoting national infrastructure in a nation that has limited infrastructure–and which even American forces were compelled to cast and indeed to consider as a tribal society that had no social structures that could be trusted or built upon. The increased lack of trust that dominated relations on the ground were more revealed by the map–as well as the lack of effort to foster a functioning government. Donald Trump may have escalated the arms trade into the Middle East to levels far beyond his predecessor, but the frustration of his successor Joe Biden was perhaps more clear-eyed than is given credit, if intentionally so: “We provided our Afghan partners with all the tools — let me emphasize: all the tools.”

But were tools of war ever enough? Biden’s remarks revealed a combination of deep dissatisfaction at returning to government after four years, and finding the same boondoggle on the table from the Bush years, and apparent exasperation. If he was trying to justify his rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan as a pivot in prioritizing strategy he had long seen as of limited benefit or without exit strategy, it betrays a deep sense of what might have been different in Afghanistan, or how the map of civil government could have been different–if the arms sent to Afghanistan in military aid was not seen as a sufficient basis to forge a civil society. The vague circumlocution “all the tools” may well come back to haunt both Biden and the world. For in the course of training and equipping a military force of 300,000 provided the basis for delivering much military support, America created spiraling costs of a global arms industry, even if the range of arms offered was not as well-suited to Afghani terrain or as protective as equipment offered NATO troops. (Oryxblog notes the poor protection these vehicles offer against feared improvised explosive devices (IEDs) compared to the MRAPs available to NATO forces in Afghanistan, and offered to police departments across the United States, but not offered to Afghan special forces.)

While the messy exit from Afghanistan appeared an uncoordinated relinquishment of control, the reliance on firepower and bombing raids as the sole veneer of stability in earlier maps of the region is revealed by the map, far more than the crumbling of a once united front of control. The GIF dramatically collapses the past four years as they unravelled over the months from May to April 13 to August 16, 2021; if it is only one of the several theaters of war, it seems to offer a compelling, if distorting story of a fall of provincial provinces in the state that the United States and the failure of rebuilding an infrastructure to which NATO committed from 2008, a loss that seems to ratchet up one’s sense of a lost opportunity. The failure of being able to control Bagram Airfield thirty miles north of Kabul–its control ceded to an Afghan army able to provide cover for fleeing Americans–was a final tragic episode in sustained lack of commitment in the ground game over more than two decades of ignoring the level of local trust that might have better created the nation’s infrastructure.

Indeed, the fraught planning of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, too easily blamed on a failure of “listening to those on the ground” who grasped the critical strategically critical nature of operations of drawing down the war rests is imbued with a sense of loss the mock up maps released by outfits as Long War Journal communicated to the viewers that reveal incomplete tactical awareness of a long-term ground game, but cunningly erased the costs of a war that inflicted such sustained damage on the country–and introduced escalating levels of violence and anti-government opposition–that little trust or loyalty remained after intense military efforts over all those years.

The costs of the pursuing of war and of bombarding much of the nation are never referenced in the maps of the advance of Taliban forces across the nation that suggest a strategic meltdown of ground-game. The “loss” of territory in the flip-book like sets of images recorded a real-time reaction to the transmission of power from American military camps, a transfer of power that was so poorly coordinated to not even allow the departing United States troops to secure Bagram Airfield, miles outside of Kabul, and the Hamid Karzai Airport to coordinate departures.

The narrative of Taliban advance is however mapped as an optic of loss. But the loss is almost hidden from visibility in the very same maps. The failure to compel Afghanistan to present Osama bin Laden and Taliban officers or training camps created the false sense of security of a show of power. It was based on and predicated the false concept of a submission of Afghanistan as best achieved by bloody bombing campaigns, drone strikes, and military incursions. For the loss of what we imagine territory held by our troops seems almost to cleanse the bloodiness of that past history. The advance of the Taliban into areas that were allegedly once in “government control”–or are labeled as such–reveal the spread of an ominous wash of deep crimson across the country as the tragic end of the War on Terror, something of a blood bath in the making, a spurt of pink and deep crimson red–as if the bloodshed was not cast by an American show of power.

Yet it erases the effects of a sustained numbers of deaths, violence and loss of blood, and the deaths of civilians that might have been prevented, already destabilized what was left of the civil government. The absences of governmental structures or webs of local allegiance allowed the superficial sense of stability that the provinces had retained, as American air power left them , and as stockpiling of arms and munitions in many former American bases provided the materiel for Taliban forces to advance even more quickly across space than they had ever expected. The insufficient supervision of arms that arrived at American bases suggested a landscape long permeated by naivite about the agency of Afghan people, and the utter the absence of training of local forces, that anticipated local governmental failure across the Forever Wars.

The readiness to point blame at a new President for not listening to the on-the-ground sources is concealed in the maps that suggest an abandonment of areas “under government control” as a betrayal–rather than a culmination of the long-term costs of a failure of effective governance of a land that long lacked centralized governance of the sort that is signified–but not demonstrated–by a map. The very national borders of what was shown to be a “nation” created a sense of false security, belied by the appearance of relatively few areas of insurgent activity across the terrain since 2018, and with little sense of the infrastructure destroyed by sustained bombing campaigns.

Afghanistan: Background and US Policy In Brief
Afghan “District Stability” and Sites of Insurgent Activity (2018)
SIGAR, January 20, 2019, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress

But the arrival of bloodshed to Afghanistan was something that the United States, of course, brought there on a scale no one had ever before imagined, flooding the nation with arms of a level of modernity as if they would defeat the society we had once called ‘tribal’ and incapable of tactical maneuvering or high-tech weaponry. As the United States assures we are As the area under “Government Control” contracts to an isolated the limited area, leaving us asking how the United States mapped it so badly. As the Government four Presidents promoted military ties contracts to a dot, but the dream of such an independent state now apparently eclipsed and recast into what may now seem more of an inter-regnum between two rulers–Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani–in a Taliban regime. Rather than being cast as a restoration of power, the map illustrated to Americans the fall of an American dream, and an eclipse of the idea of nation-building as a primarily military prospect, that the US Army took over from NATO.

The hope to recreate firm borders of Afghanistan at untold expense fell like a house of cards. The Taliban’s strategic operations for controlling the very roads on which they once attacked American and NATO forces had destroyed the structures long before the troops retreated, as they had paralyzed the country’s movement and flexibility of its soldiers or national infrastructure. The fiction that was long nourished of an Afghan state that America had been able to try to fortify by the importing armaments–the “tools of war”–over more than twenty years. While the map is a visualization that derives from the work of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and poses as a vision charting the erosion or loss of the coherence of a liberal state in the borders of Afghanistan, it both isolates the nation from its broader context in the Middle East and War on Terror–from the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in Qatar, from the allies of Taliban in Pakistan and elsewhere, or the exit of many Afghan forces as refugees, or the seizure of weapons, humvees, and armored vehicles abandoned by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) who left them behind as they fled north across the border or abandoned their posts. A map of the arrival of firearms and materiel–the procurement of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Assistance (IMET) programs that American Presidents are authorized, and with Donald Trump escalated and Barack Obama had previously–would be as helpful, as it would track a vision of a significant increase of security assistance for geopolitical dominance.

Finally revealed: UK drone strikes in Afghanistan by province – Drone Wars  UK
UK Drone Strikes in Afghanistan
Tableaux Heat map of Drone Strikes in Afghanistan by Amderican Military under Presidents Bush, Obmaa, Trump tps://dronewars.github.io/narrative/Map of Drone Strikes in Afghanistan by American Military, Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump (2018)
DRONE WARS | Narrative
Total Drone Strikes in Afghanistan and Somalia by Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump

The investment in drone escalation as a tactical relation to “space” redefined territorial dominance to replace one of community building, often confusing targets with the territory. Drone strikes not only served to “take out terrorist commanders”–but as if this did not destroy the stability of the fabric of a nation America was allegedly trying to rebuild since 2008–defined a view far from the ground. Over 13,000 drone strikes on Afghanistan alone–a minimum of 13,072 strikes killed in Afghanistan alone over 10,000–conducted by the United States Reconnaissance created a landscape being invaded by foreign powers. The dynamic of incessant drone strikes–conducted by a tool not owned by the U.S. military before the Forever Wars, and now showcased in targeted strikes is an invaluable prism to understand the mapping of the land that appears a hope for peace and end to the Forever Wars, as much as a lack of training, strategy, or American assistance. In ways that make drone strike fatalities pale, the recent estimate of 46,310 Afghan civilians–if below half of the estimated 95,000 dead Syrian civilian casualties of the War on Terror–suggests the way that the United States has benefited form the low presence of reporters on the ground.

The war in Afghanistan was located predominantly in the countryside, and across the many provinces that “fell” to a Taliban newly fortified by the windfall of armaments they accumulated as provincial cities, abandoned by the AFSN, fell. The logic that we had supplied the ANSF with sufficient arms to defend the territory reveals a confusion between the territory and the map–and the theater of combat and the situation on the ground. When Joe Biden marveled at how American-trained Afghan security forces Americans out-numbered Taliban fighters fourfold, and possessed better arms, the 298,000 armed ANSF were thinly spread and at low morale; if trained and armed by Americans, perhaps amounting to but 96,000, they lacked decisive advantage against Taliban force of 60-80,000 whose leaders effectively exploited internal weaknesses off the battlefield.

The real map–or the inside story of the progress of the Taliban across the nation–lay the perhaps not control over districts’ capitols, but the many well-stocked bases, airfields, and army depots long cultivated by American troops. The long-running bases across the country–sites with often mythic and storied names, like Kandahar and Bagram airfield, where tens of thousands of United States soldiers had been stationed from 2001–had posed a site of immense military materiel that the . The Bagram Airfield was a site for drones, of course, but also for storing cutting edge Blackhawk helicopters that the United States committed to Afghan forces, even if they were not well-trained in using or maintaining them, munitions, and firearms, even if the larger American aircraft and drones were withdrawn. As American forces withdrew, the rifles, ammunition, and tactical vehicles–as well as cars–were left at bases that the Taliban had long attacked–as Bagram—and had their eyes and were particularly keen. American commanders, as if intending to disrupt the withdrawal’s smoothness, disrupted the smooth transition by not even telling Afghans before they arrived at the Kabul airport–allowing the looting of laptops from Bagram, as a sort of bonanza, by local residents, before the arrival of Taliban forces.

Over three million items were abandoned by the U.S. Army in Bagram, from food to small weapons, ammunition, and vehicles–presuming that the “tribal” Taliban did not know how to use them–before they down-powered the entire base. Did the generals doubt that the Taliban could ever operate them, or just trust they were secure with Afghan forces? The weapons were poorly monitored. As ammunition for weapons not being left for the AFSN was destroyed, the abandonment of materiel, planes, helicopters and ground vehicles followed departure from ten other bases before Biden took office, often over NATO objections–that bestowed a huge symbolic victory of sorts to the Taliban of having driven foreigners from the land as they long promised, if not one of military materiel as wall. If American military argued “They can look at them, they can walk around — but they can’t fly them. They can’t operate them,” the ludic inversion of Taliban displaying armaments of Americans was profound theater of deep symbolic capital.

Taliban forces celebrate the withdrawal of US forces in Kandahar.
Taliban Forces Celebrate American Withdrawal from Kanadahar

If the hundreds of bases that Americans sent soldiers had long declined to dozens, the withdrawal of American forces without clear coordination with Afghans left a vast reserve of symbolic military material ready for the taking. How much was left at the bases closed in Helmand province, Laghman province, or Kunduz, as well as the bases in Nangahar, Balkh, Faryab and Zabul? Did these sites, and the reduction of American presence in Jalalabad Air Field, Kandahar Air Field, and Bagram not provide targets on which the Taliban long had eyes? The seizure of Kandahar provided an occasion for a triumphal procession of sorts, showcasing armored vehicles, as Blackhawk helicopters flying the Taliban flag flew in the skies overhead. In a poor country, the large prizes of American bases stood out like centers of wealth inequality, stocked with energy drinks, full meals, medical care and other amenities, and stockades were impossible to fully empty as the American bases closed from 2020.

Sites Supported by United States Military in Afghanistan, 2006/Globalsecurity.org

Few gave credence to Taliban boasts 1,533 ANSF joined the Taliban by May, or that June saw another 1,300 surrender, but the numbers of deserters only grew, expanding “contested” areas where Government forces lost ground without a fight. All of this crucial information is absent from the map, but we still believe, despite all we might have learned from Tolstoy, that generals and strategists determine the state of play on a battlefield, without knowing how the war was waged, or that the war was never seen as geopolitical–as it was waged–but across borders and rooted much more locally on the ground, as Taliban entered sites of former bases, and amassed arms caches in a drive of increasing momentum to Kabul–one of the only areas that wasn’t bombed so intensively, hoping it would be a reprieve from the violent bombed out landscapes on the ground.

For a war that was long pursued remotely, the image of territorial “loss” obscured the failure of engineering a transition to democracy. We have already begun debating the extent to which an executive decision-making shouldered full responsibility for the folding of the government of Afghanistan that followed the withdrawal of United States soldiers. –and air cover. We like to imagine that an American President has continued to steer global dialogue about the Afghanistan War, the remainder and reduced proxy of the War on Terror. Perhaps it is that we have a hard time to imagine a sense of an ending, and loose the ability to imagine one, and have lost any sense of a conclusion to the War on Terror that was long cast as a “just war,” against evil, and in terms of a dichotomy between good and bad, as if to disguise its protracted disaster. If we could never “see” the results of a an end to the War on Terror, Orwellianly, we were told it was not endless–Americans must have patience, said President George W. Bush as he promised us he had, to pursue a simple, conclusive, and final end to terrorism, assuring us the war would not, appearances to the contrary, grow open-ended, with a “mission creep” even greater than the Vietnam War. Barack Obama, after he presided over the military surge, hoped to “turn the page” on it in 2016. But any “exit” receded, and may not even be able to be dated 2021–as we imagine–but more protracted and indefinite than resolute–as Barack Obama, who presided over the military “surge”–hoped to “turn the page” and wind down by 2016. The logic of the war grew, as if deriving from Bush’s refusal to negotiate as was requested after the eight day of the bombing campaign, or move Osama bin Laden to a third country, but employ military might to force destruction of the camps of the Taliban, and delivery of all Taliban, fixating on the Taliban escalated the war far as an American struggle, far beyond attention to the situation on the ground.

The nightmarish reversion of Afghan territories was seen as the culmination of the withdrawal of American troops at large levels, almost achieved by President Obama in 2016, after the heights of the first “Surge” in 20011, but which was delayed by President Trump. The war that refused to end or conclude was never seen as a protracted struggle–or presented as one–but it was, and perhaps because of this never had any end in sight. “This is not another Vietnam” was announced by the father of that President, President George H.W. Bush in 1990. Americans changed the organizational structure and leadership of Afghan troops with each U.S. President, making it hard to conclude or manage, shifting how Afghans were trained, that must have encouraged a sense of clientelism and corruption of which the Afghan government became increasingly accused–and perhaps introducing a lingering suspicion of corruption and clientelism, more than bringing anything like a modern fighting army or New Model Army. There was never a sense of refusing to leave for fear that the failure that the maps depicted of the collapse of all districts of the new “Afghanistan” depended on continued American investment and support to endure.

Although the rapid reversion of districts to Taliban is far more likely to remain perceived by Republicans as a fiasco in leadership, the poor state of the country and ineffectiveness to work with the increased military materiel it was provided as if the army members did not have to be motivated and organized. The impossibility of mapping the geopolitical interests America felt onto the Security Forces–Lt. General William Caldwell IV reflected Defense Dept. opinion in the military when he assured the world Afghanistan National Security Forces were effective and trained, in fact “probably the best-trained, the best-equipped and the best-led of any forces we’ve developed yet inside of Afghanistan,” by June 2011, after a decade of military training, and only able to get better, even if American Generals were clear they would tolerate a degree of chaos, and didn’t want Afghans to be defining priorities, but only to instill a “particular kind of stability“: by 2016, National Security officials openly worried about the lack of any metrics–levels of violence, control over territory, or Taliban attacks that presented or projected confidence. The distrust, missed assessment and mutual mis-communications between American Generals who promoted and mistrusted Afghan troops whose efficiency they promoted created a disconnect between Americans as they downplayed the military ability of the Taliban, regarded as lacking sufficient air capacity or military prowess to command the nation or pose a threat to the Afghan Security Forces who folded before the Taliban’s military and threats of reprisals.

Is it possible to trace a transfer of military technologies and armaments in the twenty years since the crashing of airplanes into the Twin Towers by jihadist militants and the appropriation of sophisticated arms, night-goggles and humvees of members of the same Taliban who now occupy Baghdad? At the same time as American purchasers of handguns and firearms grew, the transfers of weapons and military firearms to the Afghan areas–UAE; Saudi Arabia; and especially Qatar–in a massive transfer of military technology that paralleled the emergence of the very groups cast as primitive rebels who had commandeered aircrafts to strike the Twin Towers into an efficient user of enhanced military tools and technologies, rather than the primitives who occupied the outer peripheries, but were both trained and prepared to occupy a nation’s center in disarmingly modern ways. Although the image of the plans flying into the Twin Towers presented an image of modernity versus premodernity, a lens through which the protracted war was pursued, as we cast the Taliban as “tribal,” and drove the Taliban into the opium production business, selling “modern” weapons and military tools into Afghanistan, the dichotomy of modern and primitive failed to present anything like a proper lens to pursue the war, although it was one American military had adopted on cue from an American President who had promised a “crusade” in no uncertain terms.

9/11

Perhaps the story of the War on Terror, in both its Afghanistan chapter and in other ways, demands to be written, when it is, as a massive transformation from the perspective of a shift of military engagement on the ground, and the military experience of the soldier, or what John Keegan called “the face of battle,” rather than the grand narratives of a conflict of civilizations in which it was framed. If the experience and strategic outlook Keegan emphasized might well be expanded, following increased awareness, to the long-term psychological and physical costs to those who were fighting, the erosion and fraying of the sense of nation and national motivation for combat must be included in the history as well, but the shift in war experience of the soldier must have shifted far more dramatically for how the “sharp end of war” appeared for the generation of the Taliban who matured in a terrain where American weapons had increasingly arrived in abundance to become part of the landscape of the state, and might be understood in terms of the shifting eras of military engagement from being attacked by bombers, targeted by drones–none of which were owned by the U.S. Army before the war, a telling index of engagement that reflects the way the war was in fact pursued at its sharp face. While in America disdain candidate Obama showed for how his opponent thought the military operated by measuring might by its navy or air force–“we have these things called aircraft carriers . . .,” suggesting one might use cavalry or bayonets as metrics in the Presidential debates in condescending tones–the shifting theater of military engagement of the Taliban, from placement of IED devices to the mastery of roadways and local influence–greater than the American soldiers on the ground.

From IED placement to suicide bombers, to rifles, kalashnikov, helicopters, and humvees, Taliban developed a new mastery of terrain, control of road networks for shipping materiel, to a n increasingly sophisticated tactical and performative use of arms and modern fighting tools that altered its experience and skill at the “sharp face of war” that we ignore, or attribute to outside assistance from Pakistani military, preferring to see the Taliban as primitive fighters without access to the technology America possesses and our provision of military “aid” as destined for “Security Forces” alone, rather than for a theater of war.

1. The current appeal of the clear mapping of the “fall” of Afghan districts to Taliban omits any senses of the line of battle. This is perhaps convenient for the military observers, who digest the war as it is pursued by American interests alone, even the NATO presence was increasingly defined in terms of the development of Afghan forces and democracy, although the “military alliance” shared by America and its Afghan ally is most often understood only in American terms. In mapping the “fall” of districts as if they were of purely strategic outposts in a geopolitical game, the map not only ignores the face of battle, but emblematizes the mis-mapping of American geopolitical interests onto Afghan interests. Despite the continued perhaps overzealous promotion of the skills of Afghan Security and the continued presence of American and NATO military failed to transition to Afghan Security Forces, even if we have continued to equip them with robust “tools of war,” without having trained them fully to fight our wars or to imagine their territorial mastery as anything like a strategic advantage for themselves.

Although the first elected President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, was a friendly figure for Americans, trained in international relations and fond of Islamic philosophy, the promise invested in him as a “transitional figure” uniting “all Afghans” was better received by the British Queen and American President, Americans have been more concerned to map Afghan strategy as if it aligned with American interests, and a global war on terror, which Afghan Security Forces were deputized to adopt. We had long mapped the Taliban Resistance or “neo-Taliban” after the Taliban had been crushed as confined in the mountians, rather than in terms of its engagement with the “sharp face” of battle and its toll on both soldiers and the civilians who lived it. We saw the Taliban as an “insurgency” confined to the mountains as if these were the margins of the nation, and located them in Tribal grounds that were opposed to the vision of a central state–or as the inhabitants of a “Triangle of Terror” they had created.

File:Neotaliban insurgency 2002-2006 en.png
“Neo-Taliban Insurgency, 2002-6”
“Triangle of Terror”

In the images of Afghanistan’s “fall,” the “face of battle” is conveniently absent. In the visualizations of “district control” that were produced in the maps of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy and reproduced across Western media, serving lambasted President Biden for some sort of dereliction of duty in concluding a forty-year old poorly thought out war? Democracy becomes something that the United States defends in these maps–or deputized Afghans to learn to defend–but the American President is suddenly seen as asleep at the wheel and not vigilant, the reverse of the image of a powerful Commander-in-Chief we desire, or the necessary and needed military “genius” who can strategically protect the national interests these visualizations reveal to have been tragically imperiled. And so we watch the “fall” of districts that had never gained independent unity, as if they failed to protect themselves from a theocratic opposition. We pretended that the failure was not the entry of increased materiel to the nation, but the global dismay at the levels of arms that are left in Afghanistan–more than are possessed by some NATO countries, and an unknown remainder of the $83 billion of materiel shipped to that nation–and the failure of Afghans to learn to use them against the Taliban, as if they were the exponents shaped by a Triangle of Terror, not affected by the shifting face of battle and “sharp edge” of war.

Increasingly, the promotion of the image of success in containing the Taliban that the U.S. Government promoted was doubted in the press, and seen as not an accurate reflection of the dominant role that the Taliban already had gained and controlled in Afghanistan, but which United States military assessments had rather dishonestly diminished, a scneario in which the maps of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy provided a needed reality check as the true crowd-sourced story of the limited amount of control that the Afghan Government controlled. The extent to which the misleading military map by which the US government was seen as exaggerating and misleading the public on Afghanistan was US government is exaggerating and misleading the public on Afghanistan reflected the more bracing judgements of the right-wing Long War Journal, which valued its ability to present a clear-eyed view of America’s strategic interests in an unvarnished or not sugar-coated geopolitical assessment that America needed in the Trump era, when the confidence in our own government declined.

We did not ever map the “sharp edge” of war, preferring to view the nation from above, either against a “Triangle of Terror” we sought to bomb and domesticize, or parsed into tribal affiliations that became the preferred means of translating Afghanistan to an American audience, which almost acknowledge the failed imperial fantasy to project Afghanistan as a nation with clear sovereign borders, or to define an objective for Afghan independence that is not backward-looking, and rooted in the cartographic attempts of Great Britain in the nineteenth century, translated into the crucial “buffer” function that might contain Pakistan, and stabilize Central Asia in a geopolitical struggle defined by the War on Terror, and not the situation on the ground, or how Americans altered that situation by their increasing military presence and profile. As the Taliban slowly gained ground over the years, and in which the logic of waging war as a protracted struggle had ceased to be worth the $6.4 trillion American taxpayers have invested in post-9/11 wars through FY2020, in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan–and the escalating future costs that the war would mean. As we have lost sight of the logic of continuing the “forever wars” into the Biden Presidency, and the vision of a “just war” has become clouded and polluted in the Trump yeas, we have lost site of any ability to imagine the ground plan for the resolution of the continuation of a War on Terror or imagine at what scale such a conclusion might ever occur.

To be sure, the advance of Taliban was not how we wanted to imagine it as a restoration of “normalcy” or a status quo, and a rejection of a theocratic government for a secular liberal ideal. But perhaps the image of Afghanistan as a liberal state was indeed a failed project, and it only existed in maps that had outlived their usefulness or reflection of the area on the ground. The “fall” of Afghanistan reflects the inability to contain the Taliban from the nation, and the weird blindness that America–and the American military and perhaps military intelligence–have to the effects of war on Afghanistan on the ground, wanting to believe in a clear chain of command, recognizable in other militaries, in the AFSN. The GIF seems to raise as many questions as it resolves of the fall of Afghanistan’s provinces to imagine what that ending looks like. As much as the number of districts that speedily negotiated a resolution of hostilities with the Taliban, the fall of Afghanistan and painful and deadly withdrawal from Kabul has been cast as the final cataclysmic episode of the War on Terror, as if President Joseph R. Biden–and Donald Trump before him–had already decided on a military withdrawal from the region was both long planned, and was indeed a means of cutting losses and leaving a region to re-dimension or re-scale the War on Terror that had been fought.

The mapping of the collapse of Afghan districts to the Taliban, cast as sudden and without any sense of occurrence, seem to justify the continuation of that war, but track the erosion of a territorial war, long morphed into a struggle whose aims are unclear. Maps that suggest a “country” of Afghanistan as land that was lost help us imagine that the authority of US forces might have trumped geography. And so we are retrospectively questioning the reporting of intelligence on the ground, trying to read the records of intelligence, or debate the false confidence projected by U.S. military through the final years of the campaign, as if this were an American decision, and a reflection of American global authority, as a microcosm of the image of the United States in the world theater, and seem to present the reassuring picture of a scenario of global politics in which wars are still fought on the ground, and which the loss of the War on Terror was not a failure of the American military, but the ceding of land by Afghans themselves who lacked ability or conviction to fight the war against theocracy that was largely scripted by American Presidents and military–who were unwilling to share their sense of their mission in Afghanistan with Afghan leaders, certain, as last as 2016, that Afghan “priorities are different from ours”–perhaps making it impossible for Afghans to take charge, as leadership of the nation was less of a gridded battlefield that became the dominant graphic that filtered, processed and mediated the withdrawal of American forces across the mainstream media.

In viewing a nation as a battlefield, we are not looking at the right map, or perhaps not looking at the right maps at all–or at the role that the arrival of military weapons played in the rendering “Afghanistan” all the more difficult to map. Perhaps the exportation of arms to the Middle East and to Afghanistan in the years since the nation’s invasion provides a better legend, and indeed a necessary legend, to map how control slipped out of the increasingly corrupt Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, established in 2004 after the United States as it assumed control of most of the country, which has been ceded–and destroyed–by the advance of the Taliban. The drawdown of troops in the country from the heights of the first surge under President Obama of 10,000 men and women has in fact been declining for years, but we have not noticed, or even looked closely at it. Yet the compelling nature of visualizations of “control” over individual districts by 2020 seemed a sudden loss of the nation, a progression of a fall of provinces culminating in the Taliban taking control over almost all of Afghanistan’s provinces, and entering Kabul, perhaps as Afghanistan seems a fitting theater or field for the master-trope of America’s imperial decline. Indeed, the attention in media maps to the delusion at an apparent absence of groundplan for American extrication or withdrawal.

These graphic visualizations are hardly accurate maps, but conveniently omit all information about the “sharp end” of battle, falling back on the geostrategic place of “control” over provinces–is this by the flags flying in their capitals? what is control in a war-torn area?–that can be understood as an element of a “Global War on Terror,” rather than the ways that the war was fought. As uncomfortable as such images might be, we prefer the “objective” GPS image “mapping” control, not pausing to ask what they miss or distort, or process the war in an episode on the War on Terror, or a lost field of battle for Afghan independence which it has long ceased to be.

The time-lapse visualization in the header to this post, of Afghan provinces shifting from “Government Control” or “Contested” to “Taliban Control” offers an image of dramatic impact, as if it were real-time, compelling as a tragic narrative, but erases the deep roots of the “lightning drive” of Taliban forces, fueled in large part both by absence of administrative unity and a massive uncoordinated influx and abandonment of arms–both left to Afghan Security forces or in caches. So strong was the flow of arms to Afghanistan and Qatar from the United States that the Biden administration only suspended arms contractors from delivering pending arms sales. Caches of arms left abandoned by Afghan Security Forces and, presumably, American military who had left them to be used by Government forces, not only destabilized the landscape of local government, but amplified a landscape by men with guns long fed by the over $40 billion contracts for firearms and ammunition flowing to the Middle East since 9/11. But if Biden assessed the Afghan Security Forces as being “as well-equipped as any army in the world” in contrast to the Taliban–and greatly outnumbering Taliban fighters–the long-term distrust of Afghan priorities and concerns left them with little sense of a common grounds for defense. As Americans were making similar assurances, Afghans were already fleeing in July to Tajikistan, where over a thousand Security Forces had already fled.

The arrival of the Taliban did not embody the victory of a theocratic to a secular regime that Americans have cast the War on Terror. The arrival of the Taliban as an armed infantry group, with its own modern military power, is an unwritten history, but was fueled by the arrival of an increased number of weapon that arrived in the region, and the transmission of military technologies across borders in ways that American governments could not perhaps imagine. Whether they were not exposed to the arrival of high tech arms of US manufacture in previous years or not, the idea that the arms that allowed Taliban members to arrive with speed in Kabul and negotiate a ready capitulation of districts, perhaps with Pakistani assistance, the seizure of of an unaccounted number of weapons caches turbocharged the advance to Kabul, in ways that not registered adequately in daunting images of the shift in districts to Taliban control. Such visualizations map a checkerboard of district that seem to track the government “control” of districts that image the erosion of a secular vision of Afghanistan. The division of Afghan lands into “districts” is almost a shorthand for the localism of Afghan politics, an admission of the difficulty of knitting together a secular state from into a centralized state, was never resolved by occupying forces or the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. More than confirm the alienation of ethnic groups from the vision of an allegedly secular government, inter-ethnic divisions have dramatically grown in the place of a coherent strategy for forging a multi-ethnic state, emblematized by an unknown CIA analysts’ map of circa 2017, that continued to map a nation bound by the red line of Afghanistan’s historical border–the “Durand” line, negotiated in the last decade of the nineteenth century–a conceit bisecting a region of Pashtun dominance and mountainous terrain that poses questions of Afghanistan’s ‘borders’ as much as it answers them. Was the retention of this imperial cartographic imaginary not suited for the sense that Afghanistan, as Samuel Moyn argued, offered a chance for the “last gaps if imperial nostalgia” in the post-Trump years, that was, improbably, able to play across the political spectrum?

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is cia-map-durand_line_border_between_afghanistan_and_pakistan-1.jpg
CIA Analyst’s Map of Afghanistan, Pashtun dominance in Blue “Tribal Belt” (CIA, c. 2007)

Is it possible that the among of weapons funneled into Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia that have disguised the cost of the War on Terror to some degree have created a huge concentration of arms in Afghanistan.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

If a rationale for the increased ability of Taliban members both to manipulate negotiations may lie in their attention to negotiations at Doha, their use military weapons may lie in the increased arrival of arms in the region. The escalation of imports and sales of arms to Afghanistan–many not registered or under the radar–escalated in the course of the Afghanistan War, and reflect a growing geopolitical significance that the nation was given to the United States, rather frighteningly similar to Vietnam, if the withdrawal from Afghanistan has been most focussed on as the greatest similarity between these two long wars, both fought at considerable hemispheric remove, only conceivable as they were logistically mapped by GPS. In both cases, wars were pursued across a complex and often oversimplified logistic chain, pursuing an elusive vision of global dominance or geopolitical strategy, whose obstacle appeared a lack of geopolitical “vision”: but was the presumption of a possibility of “global military dominance” that mismapped both military projects from a purely American point of view. The flattening of the effects of waging war only seems to have increased, paradoxically, as the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan overwhelmed the well-being of its residents, blotting it out, as the country modernized by force as it became a focus of the arms trade.

2. The investment of American taxpayers’ monies in the region was astounding, and hardly democratic, so much as a tantamount to a massive dereliction of national vision amidst the faulty reprioritization of mission creep that may be attributed as much to the military-industrial complex as to leadership or governance. Over half of all American foreign military financing arrived in Afghanistan directly by 2008, but aid had long flowed to Mujahideen and other insurgents through Pakistan, yet in later years billions of substantial materiel flowed via Qatar, location of the $1 billion CENTCOM headquarters where Americans coordinated all air operations in Afghanistan–a small nation that became the tenth largest importer of arms in the world, after South Korea, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, from 2015-19, largely from the United States, with contributions from France and Germany, jumping by 631% from 2010-14–becoming the eighth-largest market share in arms imports for 2016-2020 behind South Korea.

The absence of attention to the situation in the ground is nowhere more apparent than in the GIF that is the header to this post, which reveals the “fall” of Afghan districts to the Taliban from April, 2021. We map the hasty conclusion of the long war in GIF’s of districts, as in the header of this post, the flattening of a country that has been divided for over forty years, a form provided by the Long War Blog. The division of inhabitants of the land, or the effects of previous combat on the nation’s infrastructure and sense of security, is hardly rendered in the shape-files that flip from one hue to the other, suggesting a “lightning” advance of a militarized Taliban, evoking a sudden loss of a territorial advantage for which Americans long fought, and for which Aghans are to blame. Yet as much as the linked maps of “district control” suggest a traumatic collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the ally of the past five American Presidents, the maps collapse or elide the deep disturbances the war and importation of arms has brought to the territory that lies beneath the map, or oversimplified visualization of regional control.

Financial Times via Global Investigative Journalism, “The Taliban’s March”
source: Foundation for the Defense of Democracy’s “Long War Journal” by Mike Roggio

The quandary of designating Afghan regions by questions of “control” presumed a sense of stability and allegiance more akin to an idealized military map than to the situation on the ground. The checkerboard image of areas of “government” and areas of “Taliban” control became thinly veiled covers for a Global War on Terror in which the United States defined itself on the side of the good, that was current in a variety of maps long after the First Surge. In the context of the broad drawdown of American troops after the First Surge, as US troops level fell below 10,000 and Afghan Security Forces were celebrated for their effectiveness, the Taliban made steady gains on the ground. But the maps that suggested “stability” in government-held areas created a cocoon from which to affirm stability of a regime that never had broad institutional support as if the dangers it faced were from an “insurgency” 2002-6, and promoted an image of government control within the outlines of a national map, arriving from outside of a nation that still had retained its integrity and clear bounds as if they were able to be preserved.

“Neo Taliban Insurgency, 2002-6”

Even as Taliban presence was more clearly established than we liked to map, the image of the Taliban as outsiders in Tribal lands created a sense of justifying a “civilizing mission” that was understood as more pacific than military, underpinned by a myth or conceit that the disciplined bodies of American warriors would beat the undisciplined bodies of the Taliban. This myth was confusing the goals of the military occupation, but creating an increasingly real edge for Afghans who experienced much more fully “the sharp edge of war” both forged increased bonds between the members of the military and the fighters and the landscape among the generations of Taliban fighters, and their logic of responding to a military strategy American generals mismapped on a geostrategic checkerboard–the very checkerboard that Foundation for the Defense of Democracies encouraged us to understand the success, progress, or challenges of combat, and indeed control their fears and responses to technologies of combat imported to the region by the United States.

Fall of Districts by July 1, 2021, documented by Fazl Raman Muzary, from local media and on the ground reports

The deep concern of a lack of “strategic vision” was not the best way to understand military engagement of Taliban forces, or to cast the compact shift of district loyalty after the American withdrawal.

But these terms provided the terms to condemn and bewail the broad geopolitical military failure read into the maps of Taliban advance in August, 2021, apparently confirming that the AFSN had built up as our surrogate was unable to “face” the Taliban militia we continue to cast as “rebels” or “insurgents.” But the negotiated settlement allowed te rapid fall of a number of districts, as while it required the Taliban cease hostilities with NATO and American troops who had negotiated the settlement, the terms allowed Taliban forces to concentrate on negotiating settlements with local regions, exploiting divisions and existing corruption of Ghani’s Afghan government, boosted by the concessions to release 5,000 prisoners in the past, and the opening of jails in districts whose centers they captured or negotiated a solution.

Donald Trump may have escalated the arms trade into the Middle East to levels far beyond his predecessor, but the frustration of his successor has perhaps provided a far more clear-eyed assessment, perhaps more than he is given credit. “We provided our Afghan partners with all the tools — let me emphasize: all the tools,” U.S. President Joseph R. Biden sternly told the nation, in a combination of evident dissatisfaction and apparent exasperation, in justifying his rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The vague circumlocution “all the tools” may well come back to haunt both Biden and the world. For in the course of training and equipping a military force of 300,000 provided the basis for delivering much military support, America created spiraling costs of a global arms industry, even if the range of arms offered was not as well-suited to Afghani terrain or as protective as equipment offered NATO troops. (Oryxblog notes the poor protection these vehicles offer against feared improvised explosive devices (IEDs) compared to the MRAPs available to NATO forces in Afghanistan, and offered to police departments across the United States, but not offered to Afghan special forces.)

It is hard to tally or come to terms with the human cost of post-9/11 wars. Over 9,000 Americans have died, or the hundreds of thousands who returned from the wars, injured in body or psyche, the roughly 6,200 U.S. military personnel, contractors, humanitarian workers and journalists killed in Afghanistan since the U.S. government invaded are left off the map, but the legacy may be greatest for the huge amounts of military materiel shipped into the Middle East–arms that helped in some way to “modernize” the current Taliban, who may have received training from Pakistan intel–as well as the huge losses of population and infrastructure in Afghanistan, where about 71,000 Pakistani and Afghan civilians are estimated to have been killed–a staggeringly disproportionate number in crossfire, bombing raids, drone attacks, suicide bombings in Kabul and other bases, IED’s and night-time raids by NATO or American troops.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Afghanistan War, Kabul, military maps, War on Terror

Gravity’s Landscapes: Bombed Out Landscapes over Time

When the Germain army declared, in April of 1942, as accelerating violence of global war brought the arrival of the British bombing of German towns, the wartime Nazi government boasted that they would use native maps in the public domain to destroy valued buildings in England with impunity. over 20,000 bombs fell on the city of London, destroying beyond repair 116,000 buildings, they left a bombed out landscape that has been forgotten with time, but increasingly offers an eery reflection of the twenty-first century’s bombed out landscapes created by saturation bombing raids that the precision strikes of GPS-enabled missiles allows. The bomb sites persisted long after World War II ended, scarring the urban landscape as it was dramatically overbuilt in n unheard of density unforeseen in wartime years, so that it has increasingly faded from our collective memory, even as we try to prevent the bombed out landscapes of recent memory becoming a terrifyingly blur.

In blood-curdling claims that prefigure the American threat to violate international law by targeting of historical sights in Iran, the bombardment of Syrian cities by Iranian supplied forces, the bombing of cities in Ukraine, or the Israeli bombardment of Gaza by precision strikes, the V-2 bombing of London began from the declarative Teutonic bast of a boast,’We shall go out and bomb every building in Britain marked with three stars in the Baedeker Guide.” The conversion of a tourist map to a map of targets may suggest slippage between German fetishization of precision in tourist maps tied to cultural formation to a German Luftwaffe’s determination for an arial blitzkrieg determined to destroy historical sites. The precise strikes of flattening a landscape by V-1 bombs and V-2 rockets blanketed England with a “Vergeltungswaffe” of vengeance weapons, an air-launched arsenal designed to destroy whatever had once been celebrated on the map, with a destruction that was poorly processed in literary terms as it was hardly able to be understood.

A screaming comes across the sky . . . it has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now.” There was no precedent for the destruction of the London Blitz, and the experience of a bombed out landscape was hard to distance oneself from–and all but impossible to map. If Thomas Pynchon invited us to imagine the progressive targeting of the city–writing in a time when many bombed out areas of London were still fenced off, some still not benefitting from the Lend Lease act of government financing, and some still present in the 1970s, when I visited the city as a child, the bombed out landscape is impossible to imagine in real time, perhaps, as the front lines of war blurred with the home front. During the blitz, Graham Greene gave it his Eton best, chiding Anthony Powell how the bombing raids made London “extraordinarily pleasant these days with all the new spaces” as rocket bombs had torn through buildings: Greene distanced himself from violence by affecting admiration for the “rather Mexican effect of ruined churches.” He was not only being picturesque, but looking back on the hatred he felt for the Mexican landscape whose ruins he had officially visited in 1937-8, while investigating Socialist outlawing of Catholicism in Mexico; the dark sarcasm no doubt concealed fears rockets rendered the capitol akin to the landscape he saw as a periphery whose poverty and dishonesty he loathed as “a state of mind” without morals, economic precarity, bad food and drink, and bad faith.

The bombing of London followed the escalation of raids launched on Germany from seven airfields built for the purpose in East Anglia, after 1940, which had dropped seven hundred and thirty-two thousand tons of bombs on German cities by the new strategy of “carpet bombing,” creating firestorms in German cities from Cologne to Bremen, from Würzburg to Stuttgart, and many more, creating landscapes of instant ruins in a form of psychological warfare that seems to effective to be almost omitted from German postwar literature. Whatever churches Greene saw in Tabasco and Chiapas were empty of ritual or priests by state decree, secret Masses confined to private houses by priests who register with civil authorities after agrarian and land reforms stripped the church of property. If Mexico seemed a periphery, London seemed in danger of becoming one, as Britain’s bombardment by Germans hoped to reduce England’s capitol to ruins; he disdained American superiority to Mexico whose wealth they had extracted, and thought little of the “cold, snarky chambers” of Mexican ruins in the seventh century Mayan city of Palenque, but the bombing of London by “vengeance weapons” threatened rapidly to reduce the metropole by a Third Reich that hoped to triumph over Britain by consigning it to the past to bring to a close an early historical epoch.

If Mexico was “a country to die in and leave ruins behind,” the specter of silent, majestic ruins may have been hard to map onto London, but the Bomb Damage map undertaken by surveying the buildings damaged and destroyed by German bombs provide a fascinating attempt to maintain equilibrium in a time of devastation. The evocation of a ruins was telling at a time in the almost exactly eight month bombing campaign from October 1940 to early June 1941. V-2 “vengeance weapons”–or simply “revenge weapons”–were unlike earlier types of war, definitively shifting military hostilities to a home front. If Graham Greene had imagined Mexico as the glamour site of the adventures of Pancho Villa in his childhood, the dangerous landscape of wartime suggested , the start of a campaign whose targets were chosen from a travel guide was a metaphor of how bomb strikes might close a historical epoch by sheer application of force, confirming the imperial destiny claimed for the Third Reich, and reduce London to the material traces of a past Germans long studied of Rome’s Empire and ancient Greece.

It must have been quite hard to watch the raids at the stoic remove it demanded, but the British were up to it. The emigre bookseller and intellectual historian Chimen Abramsky tied to wacth at close hand London’s bombing unfold by binoculars from the roof of his Highgate residence, scanning the urban landscape for the sight or sound of bombs’ inevitable before joining fire brigades to rush to the scene to mitigate flare-ups in urban neighborhoods, stunned “London was on fire, burning from four sides,” as if the Nazi invasion of Poland, Belarus and Russia had followed him and his father refuge. The V-2 bombs were perhaps only a rehearsal for the aggressive carpet bombing of the Siege of Stalingrad of late August 1942 they preceded; the utter destruction of those air raids challenged novelist Vasily Grossman’s points of reference–“Everything burned down. Hot walls of buildings, like the bodies of people who have died in the terrible heat and not yet cooled down . . . miraculously standing–amid thousands of vast stone buildings now burnt down or half-destroyed,” he wrote in his notebooks. Stalingrad became a landscape of historical ruins, “like Pompeii, caught by destruction in the fullness of life.”

Is it an an oddly English response to try to map this destruction in poignant pastels, as in the header to this post? The elegant maps of the destruction of buildings that were tallied with care during the Blitz cartographically process the bombs’ arrival in an array of watercolors, as if to hold at distance the violence done to place with which each writer–Greene; Abramsky; Grossman–struggle to frame in a language of ruins that suggest historical breaks. They affirm the continuity of the landscape, rather valiantly, against Ordnance Maps, as if to chart hopes for rebuilding.

They are far leess abstracted than recent dense collection of red datapoints of where bombs hit in the recent webmap “Bombsight” charts, which illustrate the overpowering reach of the rockets but makes it hard to comprehend the scale of their effects by the density of these crowded datapoints on a Google Maps base map–even if one zooms in on closeups on individual neighborhoods against the muted generic landscape of a base map. The unprecedented intensity on London, temporally collapsed, challenges the viewer to process the impact of eight months of rockets in totality. The preservation of a set of hand-painted Bomb Damage Maps created to assess the rockets’ devastation in real time offer keys to navigate that experience, as records of the cartographic reaction to the modern violence they wrecked and the transformed urban landscapes that so many Londoners continued to inhabit.

Mapping the World War II Bomb Census: Rockets Targeting London, October 7, 1940-June 6, 1941
Bombsight

As the destruction of these cities fades from collective memory, the online sources of like “Bombsight” that aggregate actual geodata placing the density with which all rockets and bombs dropped on the city in individual time frames offer something like a slider bar to view the violence, without the fire and death, remotely on our screens. But how to describe or take stock of the scale of such devastation, let alone to do so in a map, or to make contemporary maps and accounts to be embodied in an adequate spatial form? For the journalist Grossman, bombs that fell amidst the flames of burning houses over Stalingrad redefined the place as it had been known from maps, and redefined the lived space of the city that were unable to take stock of by a single observer. “It was no longer a matter of individual explosions; all space was now filled by a single dense, protracted sound” of the howls of bombs, air cloudy with white dust and smoke, the characters of his novel search for images of Pompeii, wondering if any one will remember them, the thunder of explosions and crack of anti-aircraft guns marking time against the howl of a bomb that grew in volume, altering one’s sense of time as “howling seconds, each composed of hundreds of infinitely long or entirely distinct fractions of seconds,” erased desire, memories, or “anything except the echoes of this blind iron howl.”

Whether referencing the obliteration of space by the Baedecker guides was a conceit of historical migration of empires or conflated cartographical superiority of touristic guides with the precision of aerial bombardment suggests the crossing of categories of bombarding civilian populations. The obliteration of clearly demarcated lines haunted Stalingrad’s bombardment included modern incendiary bombs, for Grossman, as tens of thousands of which small canisters that could tumble out of in containers of thirty-six filled the air with a distinct screeching unlike the whistles of high explosives, a screeching that echoed the screeching of the V-2 bombs that Thomas Pynchon employed as the arresting auditory perception of the mesmerizing opening sentence of Gravity’s Rainbow focusses on the “new sound” then unknown of “A screeching came across the sky” . . . Grossman focussed on the “new sound” bombs made in Stalingrad as unlike the whistle of hunters of high-explosive bombs, but “penetrated every living being [from the] hearts of those about to die [to the] hearts of those who survived–all hearts clenched in tight anguish,” so that “there was no one who did not hear it as they plunged into the city, rendering “building after building joined in a single blaze and whole burning streets fused into a single, living, moving wall . . . as if a new city of fire had appeared over Stalingrad,” introduced by the distinct sounds that follow the arrival of “planes coming from north, west, east and south [that] met over Stalingrad,” whose descent on the scientific “seemed to be the sky itself that was descending–sagging, as if under dark, heavy storm clouds, under the vast weight of metal and explosives.”

To register the new city rendered by daily destruction, lest the earlier city by lost, the London City Council undertook in a valiant act of cartographic preservation during the air attacks from September, 1940, just after the Germans had planned to invade Russia, to 1941, and amplified with the attacks of V-2 rockets by 1944, to ensure a level of destruction more sudden and more terrifying than the incendiary bombing of Stalingrad. The ways that the British Army mapped the destruction that V-2 rockets of terrifying precision were able to carve out of the city of London had been long lost, but the recovery of these map provides an eery echo of the historical models and precedents of civilian targeting of historical sites that haunts the contemporary world. For he scars of ethanol-fueled V-2 rockets that speedily struck wartime London seventy years ago are a good place as any to start to map the systematic bombing of civilian spaces.  As if mapping the liquid-fueled fantasies of destruction of Wernher von Braun, the V-1 and then, subsequently, V-2 bombs silently arrived to create a psychologically searing topography of death that transformed the city, immersing civilians to new topographies of fear.

The contemporary graphic tabulations of damages in recently published Bomb Damage Maps  orient one in chilling ways to the progress and degree of bombing wartime London in purples, violets, oranges, and light blue on London’s familiar plan.  The pastels are disarmingly tranquil if not placid in tenor, but seem to conceal within a Benjamin Moore-like in their variety, which seem to reveal a of destruction wonderfully measured concealment  resistance of a British culture of grim-faced exactitude to the horrific episode of wartime destruction, generations away from the bombardment of images of bombed out landscapes in Beirut, Syria, or so much of the Middle East and Libya today.  If these pencilled sketches seem oddly antiquated and removed, the poignant attempt to come to terms with the radically escalation of destruction in the  devastatingly regular tempo of accelerating bombardment that is known as the London Blitz–even if they cannot capture the panic, commotion, terrified screams or chaos, in the muted pastels in an aerial perspective that affirm the organic city that once existed in a still alive past.  The three weeks of airstrikes on Gaza that have focussed on obliterating a density of buildings and underground tunnels in Gaza City to drive an underground terrorist cells form the region are only the latest of focussed campaigns; can their experience be better understood by guides to process aerial bombing raids in the past?

The images of community that they preserve in a time of the compacting of time and space stand in a bizarre psychological counterpoint to the terror of the Blitz, an attempt to maintain level-headedness perhaps in the methodical taking of stock of the sites that were apparently be turned into Baedekers of a future lost world. The bombs that clustered on London in the Blitz are not only preserved, but collated, in a stunning overpowering overlay that suggests a puncturing of space if not obliteration–in a collation of the sites of all German bombs dropped on London in the Blitz, September 1940-June 1941, courtesy “Bombsight“, embracing a massive repository of spatial information aggregating locations of all bombs dropped on the city.

The data is so overwhelming, of course, that the viewer is vertiginously unable to process the extent of detail it aggregates, in what might be better known as a Cartofail. The multiple maps that were made by the Bomb Damage Maps tend in the reverse: they preserve the underlying street network and sites of all buildings in the city, preserving a palimpsest that survives in the face of aerial bombardment that attempted to efface any sign of human habitation; the result is a valiant basis for the recreation of the future of London in a dark period, and a particularly healthy and plucky form of cartographic resistance, of sorts, running against the collapsing of time and space in a time of total war, by trying to retain and train attention on what exists in the city that can be preserved lest it be forgotten. In the face of total war, it is a resistance of exactitude.

The maps recall those colored glossy stars pasted, in the manner of pins, at the sites of explosions in London, which “cover the available spectrum” from silver to green, gold, red, blue, and  a surprising preponderance in certain areas of violets whose locations seem to coincide with bomb strikes, but are so  suspiciously marked with the names of women, the silver ones labelled “Darlene,” others Alice, Delores, Shirley, Sally, amidst  Carolines, Marias, Annes, Susans and Elizabeths.  The disjunction between names and places map the interior experience of Lt. Slothrop against the city that became a canvass of war, but the placid colorings of the map hues suggest a deeper disjunction between mapmaking and violence.

The maps capture an attempt to take measure of the scale of destruction, from black areas bombed out beyond repair to more lightly damaged areas in yellow, as if to process the unprecedented scale of disaster in the precision of the Ordnance Survey Maps. In ways that seemed to try to contain the violence of the bombs that killed over 9,000 by a coloring the sites that were hit by the daily assessment of bomb damages, Bomb Damage Charts drafted by the London City Council tried to process the daily destruction that took the toll of 9,000 in what Germans portrayed as revenge for allied bombers suggest an English tabulation of the ethanol-fueled violence, called as retribution for allied bombing of German cities, that revealed fingerprints of the fantasy of Wernher von Braun, the rocket scientist who was driven by truly stratospheric aspirations to reach the moon.

waterloo-detail-bombs

And they reflect, as such an attempt to map the devastation Thomas Pynchon so famously began Gravity’s Rainbow by suggesting the sudden arrival of an ethanol-fueled V-2 rocket that struck the zero Greenwich meridian around 1967, by describing a volley of ballistic missiles whose targeted strikes and explosions brought to life something like a new world, and a terrible one that is punctuated in a senseless sequence of devastating strikes.  And as Pynchon famously used the Matthausen testimonies to describe the horrors of the bombs’ production during the war by the remain side, the bomb damage maps would have provided powerful means to elaborate the destruction of the city came to map the fictionalized if troubled ever-idiosyncratic psyche of Tyrone Slothrop.  The rooftop observations of the arrival of V-2’s that arrive, arching short of the land and arriving on London, tracked by a group of Yanks, stationed at the Allied Clearing House, Technical Unites, Northern Germany (ACHTUNG), a paper warren filled with black typewriters that pose as grave markers, removed from the war but close to its violence.

As much as orient one to the destruction of bricks and mortar buildings, they suggest a way to complete the terrifying topographies of the wartime city, as familiar cityscapes suddenly vanished, taking human lives in a chaos difficult to psychologically sustain.  If Stephen Spender described how in “destroyed German towns one often feels haunted by the ghost of a tremendous noise” as it “is impossible not to imagine the rocking explosions, the hammering of the sky upon the earth, which must have caused all this,‟ evoking the inability to grasp or orient oneself to the ineffability of the sensory barrage of modern destruction with particular eloquence.  Pynchon was particularly attentive to transpose the complicated topographies of what were otherwise blank space by recourse to the “old Baedeker trick” not limited to that genre of travel books alone, but pillaging from WPA guides and other maps, in ways that make it more than likely that something like the Bomb Damage Maps provided a similar basis to orient his readers to imagining the new topography of war in which his characters sought to navigate as best they could, and the tourist maps of post-war London which rendered the continued effects of bombed out areas light green offered an effective palimpsest as any to recover the  psychological trauma of the destruction of the psychic network of place and society–

close-up

–itself a mirror image to the German Schadenskarten created to document the parallel six years of trauma inflicted on cities in the Nazi state.

1280px-Luftbild_Freiburg_1944.jpgStadtarchiv Freiburg, destruction of Freiburg sometime after or during Summer of 1945

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Filed under London Blitz, military maps, Vietnam War, war crimes, World War II